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We study the propositional model logic of knowledge and time for distributed systems. We 
consider a number of logics (ninety-six in all!), which vary according to the choice of language 
and the assumptions made on the underlying system. The major parameters in the language 
are whether there is a common knowledge operator, whether we reason about the knowledge 
of one or more than one processor, and whether our temporal operators are branching or 
linear. The assumptions on distributed systems that we consider are: whether or not 
processors forget, whether or not processors learn, whether or not time is synchronous, and 
whether or not there is a unique initial state in the system. We completely characterize the 
complexity of the validity problem for all the logics we consider. This paper focuses on lower 
bounds; a sequel will deal with the corresponding upper bounds. Typical results include a 
fit-completeness result for the language with common knowledge with respect to systems 
where processors do not forget, and a corresponding non-elementary-time result for the 
language without common knowledge. It is shown that, in general, the assumption that 
processors do not forget or do not learn greatly increases the complexity of reasoning about 
knowledge and time. 0 1989 Academic Press, Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It has been argued recently that knowledge is a useful concept for analyzing the 
behavior and interaction of processors in a distributed system [CM, DM, FI 1, Hal, 
HF, HMl, LR, MT, PR, RK, Ros]. When analyzing a system in terms of 
knowledge, not only is the current state of knowledge of the processors in the 
system relevant, but also how that state of knowledge changes over time. A formal 
propositional logic of knowledge and time was first proposed by Sato [Sal; others 
have since been proposed by Lehmann [Lel], Fagin et al. [FHVl], Parikh and 
Ramanajum [PR], and Ladner and Reif [LR]. Still others are implicit in all the 
other references cited above. 
While Sato proved a nondeterministic exponential upper bound for his logic, 
Lehmann stated a theorem claiming a doubly exponential upper bound for his logic 
(which included common knowledge), and Ladner and Reif prove that one of their 
logics is undecidable. This apparant inconsistency is, of course, due to the fact that 
all these papers actually consider different logics. To add to the confusion, these 
papers use the same notation with different interpretations. 
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In this paper we try to bring some order to this confusion by categorizing logics 
for knowledge and time along two major dimensions: the language used and the 
assumptions made on the underlying distributed system. By varying these 
parameters, we end up with ninety-six logics. (Of course, they are not all of equal 
interest to distributed computing!) All of the logics considered in the papers men- 
tioned above lit into our framework. Our major results involve completely charac- 
terizing the complexity of all these logics, showing how the subtle interplay of the 
parameters can have a tremendous impact on complexity. 
The languages considered in the literature vary according to the modalities used 
for knowledge and time. As far as knowledge goes, the relevant issue is whether the 
language can talk about the knowledge of more than one agent, and whether we 
have a modal operator in the language for common knowledge (where common 
knowledge of a fact cp holds if everyone knows cp, everyone knows that everyone 
knows cp, etc.). For time, the question is whether we use branching time or linear 
time modalities (which essentially amounts to whether or not we can quantify over 
the possible executions of a program). 
It is well known that if we consider either knowledge or time alone, the language 
used has a great impact on the complexity of the logic. As was shown by Halpern 
and Moses [HM2], the complexity of reasoning about knowledge for the notion of 
knowledge most appropriate for distributed systems (which satisfies the axioms of 
the modal logic S5), the validity problem for the logic is co-NP-complete if we can 
only reason about one agent or processor in the language, PSPACE-complete with 
two or more agents, and EXPTIME-complete if we add common knowledge to the 
language. If we consider time alone, the validity problem for the language with 
branching time modalities is EXPTIME-complete [EHl], while for the language 
with linear time modalities it is PSPACE-complete [SC]. Not surprisingly, we find 
a similar phenomenon here; the complexity of reasoning about knowledge and time 
depends on the language used. What is perhaps more interesting is how the 
assumptions made on the underlying distributed system, which essentially place 
conditions on the interaction between knowledge and time, affect complexity. 
The types of assumptions on the system that are typically made include whether 
or not processors forget (the assumption of no forgetting has also been called 
unbounded memory or cumulative knowledge in other papers [FHV2, HV, MO]), 
whether or not processors can learn, whether or not there is a unique initial state in 
the system, and whether time is synchronous or asynchronous. We now explain each 
of these parameters in more detail and motivate them in terms of distributed 
systems. 
We first discuss the notion of knowledge in a distributed system. Although there 
have been many papers that consider this notion, they all have the same essential 
features. A distributed system is identified with a set of possible runs of the system, 
where a run is a complete history of the system’s behavior over time. Thus, the run 
may include such things as each processor’s initial state and its complete message 
history (i.e., the messages it has sent and received, in the order they were sent and 
received, time-stamped if the processors have local clocks). Formally, assume we 
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have a system of m processors, each of which at any time is in some local state. This 
local state may encode such things as the processor’s initial state, part or all of its 
message history, and the values of relevant variables. A run is a function from time 
(which, for simplicity, we assume is discrete and ranges over the natural numbers) 
to global states of the form (I,, . . . . I,,,), where Ii is the local state of processor i.’ 
Given a run r and a time n, we can think of the global state r(n) as a “snapshot” 
describing the current state of the system. We can think of n as denoting the time 
on some external global clock (not necessarily observable by the processors). 
Following [HMl 1, we call such a pair (r, n) a point. 
Processor i is said to know a fact cp (written Kicp) at a given point if cp is true at 
all other points in which it is in the same state. Intuitively, a processor cannot dis- 
tinguish two points if it is in the same state in both; thus it knows cp if cp is true at 
all the points it cannot distinguish from the true state of affairs.2 We say a processor 
considers run r’ possible at point (r, n) if for some n’, it cannot distinguish (r, n) 
from (r’, n’). 
We say a processor does not forget if the set of runs the processor considers 
possible stays the same or decreases over time (intuitively, as a result of the 
processor getting more information). So if at some point (r, n) in run r processor i 
considers run r’ possible, then run r was indistinguishable from r’ at all points in 
the past. Intuitively, a processor that cannot distinguish two runs that it could 
distinguish at an earlier time must have “forgotten” the information that allowed it 
to distinguish those runs. Note that no forgetting intuitively requires unbounded 
memory, so that a processor can store all the information it has received. Thus, the 
distinction between forgetting and no forgetting essentially corresponds to whether 
we view our processors as finite-state machines or Turing machines. 
The dual notion to “no forgetting” is “no learning.” A processor does not learn if 
the set of runs it considers possible stays the same or increases over time. More for- 
mally, if at some point (r, n) processor i considers run r’ possible, then processor i 
will consider run r’ possible at all times in the future (i.e., at all points (r, n’) with 
n’ 2 n). If processor i cannot distinguish two points (r, 0) and (r’, 0) in a system 
with no learning and no forgetting, then i goes through the same sequence of states 
in both r and r’, regardless of what messages i may receive. Such a system essen- 
tially corresponds to a non-adaptioe algorithm; a processor does not modify its 
actions in response to signals from the outside world. In this precise sense, we can 
say that no learning takes place. 
In some systems the assumption is made that each processor has a unique initial 
state. This means that there is a unique initial global state for the system (i.e., for all 
i In a more general model we might augment the global state to include a component describing the 
enoironmenl, which intuitively consists of all the relevant features of the system not described by the 
processors’ local states, such as messages in transit but not yet delivered, and so on (cf. [FHVZ]). The 
environment component plays no role in the complexity analysis, so we omit it here. 
2 This interpretation of knowledge is called a state-based interpretafion in [HMl], and is essentially 
the interpretation used in [PR, HF, Ros, RK, FIl]. We will not consider the more general epistemic 
interpretntions discussed in [HMl]. 
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runs I and r’, the global states r(0) and r’(0) are identical). The assumption of a 
unique initial state seems fairly innocuous. After all, we can always add a new initial 
state to every run and then let it develop as it did before. However, as we shall see, 
this assumption is not so innocuous when combined with the assumption of no 
learning. 
In a synchronous system, we assume that a processor has access to a global clock 
that ticks at every instant of time and the clock reading is part of its state, so the 
processor always knows the time. Note that protocols that proceed in rounds can 
be viewed as running in synchronous systems. 
An interpreted system is a pair (R, x), where R is a system and rr is a truth 
assignment to the primitive propositions at every point of R. There is a 
straightforward way to extend rt to all formulas (the details are discussed in the 
next section). For the rest of our discussion, it will be useful to have notation for 
different classes of interpreted systems and different languages. We use ?Z to 
represent the class of all interpreted systems. We then use subscripts nf, nl, uis, sync 
to indicate restrictions to interpreted systems where, respectively, processors do not 
forget, processors do not learn, where there is a unique initial state, and where the 
system is synchronous. Thus, for example, V~(nf,sync,uls) represents the class of inter- 
preted systems where processors do not forget, the system is synchronous, and there 
is a unique initial state. 
We use the notations CKL,,,, CKB,,,, KL,,,, and KB,,, to describe the 
languages we use. The L and the B tell us whether linear time or branching time 
modalities are used, the presence or absence of C in the name indicates whether or 
not common knowledge is included, and the subscript indicates the number of 
agents. Thus, CKL,,, is the language that uses linear time modalities and has modal 
operators K,, K2, and C for the knowledge of agent 1, agent 2, and common 
knowledge. (We describe the language and give its semantics in detail in the next 
section. ) Similarly, KBoj is the language that uses branching time modalities and 
Ki, i = 1,2,3, but has no modal operator for common knowledge. 
The logics that have been considered in other papers can now be classified as 
follows. Sato [Sal and Lehmann [Lel] restrict attention to %?c(nl,sync): synchronous 
systems where processors do not forget. Lehmann uses the languages CKL,,,; Sato 
essentially does as well (although his language does not have explicit temporal 
operators). Halpern and Fagin [HF], Parikh and Ramanujam [PR], and the tree 
logic of protocols of Ladner and Reif [LR] also assume no forgetting, but do not 
require that time be synchronous, so the class of interpreted systems considered for 
these logics is %&,r). On the other hand, these papers differ in the languages they 
consider: CKL,,, in [HF] and KB(,) in [PR, LT].3 Ladner and Reifs linear logic 
3 Actually, in [PR] there are also modal operators for what is called implicit knowledge in 
[HMl, HMZ]. In addition, the branching time modalities used in [PR] and [LR] only give us a subset 
of the language KB,,, ( a different subset in each of the papers). However, these differences have no 
impact on the complexity, so we do not focus on them further here. Also, the fact that the systems in 
[LR] are actually trees instead of sets of runs imposes another mild condition that we briefly discuss in 
the next section. Again, this difference has no impact on complexity. 
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ofprotocols, despite the name, also uses (a subset of) branching time, but restricts 
attention to the class of interpreted systems ~nf,nl,uis), where processors neither 
forget nor learn, and there is a unique initial state. In the remaining papers that 
consider formal models of knowledge and time [CM, FIl, Ros, RK], the 
assumption of no forgetting is not imposed; all the interpreted systems in V are 
considered. However, in [Ros, RK] linear time is used, while [CM, FI 1 ] implicitly 
use branching time, although neither of these latter two papers explicitly has 
temporal operators in their logics. 
We do not discuss here which of these logics is most appropriate. Our feeling is 
that the choice should be guided by the application at hand (see [Pn, La2, EH2) 
for a discussion of these issues in the context of linear vs. branching time logics). 
Instead, we focus our attention on the complexity of the decision procedures for 
each of them. 
At a high level, we can view our results as saying that assuming either no 
forgetting or no learning tends to make the complexity of reasoning about 
knowledge and time much worse. For example, if we have common knowledge in 
the language (and at least two agents, since common knowledge reduces to 
knowledge if we have only one agent), then the validity problem with respect to 
many classes of interpreted systems where processors do not forget or do not learn, 
such as (e,,,, and V&), is wildly undecidable, in fact, l-I:-complete. (A precise 
definition of nt appears in Section 3.) This means that there can be no complete 
axiomatization for these cases (since a complete axiomatization would imply that 
the set of valid formulas was r.e.).4 On the other hand, for classes such as V or 
%? (sync,uisj, where we do not make the assumption that processors do not learn or do 
not forget, the complexity of the validity problem for the language with common 
knowledge is (only! ) EXPTIME-complete. 
A similar situation arises if we consider the language without common 
knowledge. Although the validity problem in the presence of no forgetting or no 
learning is in general decidable, it is non-elementary; if we do not make the 
assumption that processors do not learn or do not forget, the validity problem 
is either PSPACE-complete or EXPTIME-complete (depending on whether we 
consider linear time or branching time). 
There are some anomalous situations though, mainly those involving the com- 
bination of no learning and a unique initial state. For example, Ladner and Reif 
show that the validity problem for KB,,, is undecidable (even without common 
knowledge in the language) with respect to ~~(nT,nl,uis). An easy extension of their 
proof shows it is actually nt-complete; these results also hold for the language 
KL,*,. On the other hand, if we consider the class of interpreted systems 
59 (nr,n,,sync,uls), where we impose the additional condition of synchrony, the situation 
4 As we remarked above, Lehmann claimed a doubly exponential time decision procedure for his 
logic, which is CKL,,, interpreted over interpreted systems in %?~nl.Eync,. He also claimed a complete 
axiomatization [Lel]. Lehmann later retracted these claims and only claimed these results for the one- 
agent case, without common knowledge [Le2]. Of course, our results show that the original claims were 
in fact incorrect, 
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collapses. The validity problem for this logic is EXPSPACE-complete, even with 
common knowledge in the language! Intuitively, the reason is that the combination 
of these assumptions implies that no expressive power is gained by having common 
knowledge or more than one agent in the language. 
Our results are summarized in Fig. 1. The results given in the table are tight: the 
upper bounds match the lower bounds (to within constant factors). In order to 
explain the results for the languages KL,,, and KB,,,, m 3 2, in the first two rows 
of the table in a little more detail, we must introduce some notation. Let ex(m, n) be 
defined inductively via ex(0, n) = n, ex(m + 1, n) = 2excm3n) (so that, intuitively, 
ex(m, n) is a stack of m 2’s, with the top 2 having exponent n), let the alternation 
depth of cp, written ad(q), be the number of alternations of distinct knowledge 
modalities (J&3) in cp, and let 1~1 be the length of cp when viewed as a string of sym- 
bols. The nonelementary time bound means that there is an algorithm for deciding 
if a formula q is valid which runs in time ex( 1 + ad(q), c IcpI), for some constant 
c>O. Furthermore, any algorithm for deciding validity must run in time 
ex( 1 + ad(q), ci 1~1) for some constant d > 0 and infinitely many formulas cp. The 
explanation of the nonelementary space bound is analogous. Note that, by 
definition, for any formula cp of KL, 1 ) or KB(,, we have ad(q) < 1. Thus, the bounds 
for KL(,,/KB(,, in the first two rows of the table are special cases of the bounds for 
KL~,)/KB~,). In particular, Lehman& doubly exponential time upper bound for 
KL, is a special case of ours. 
The difference between the nonelementary time bounds in the first row of the 
table, and the nonelementary space bounds in the second row of the table can 
roughly be explained by noting that allowing learning gives us the ability to encode 
alternation. More precisely, when we have no forgetting but allow learning, we can 
encode alternating Turing machines that run in space ex(ad(cp), c 1~1) (which 
corresponds to time ex(ad(cp) + 1, c 1~1); once we impose the assumption of no 
CK&&%+ 
m>2 KL,m,IKB,,,, m > 2 KL,n,IKB,,, 
rIl 
n; 
rll 
co-r.e. 
EXPSPACE 
Nonelementary (time 
Mad(v)+ 1, c Id)) 
Nonelementary (space 
exbd(cp). c IPI)) 
rIl 
co-r.e. 
EXPSPACE 
EXPTIME PSPACE for KL,,,, PSPACE for KL,,,, 
EXPTIME for KE,,, EXPTIME for Kit,,, 
Double-exponential 
time 
EXPSPACE 
EXPSPACE 
EXPSPACE 
EXPSPACE 
FIG. 1. The complexity of the validity problem for logics of knowledge and time. 
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learning, we can only encode deterministic Turing machines that run in space 
ex(ad(rp), c Id). 
Given the number of results, we concentrate on the lower bound proofs in this 
paper, deferring proofs of upper bounds and complete axiomatizations (in the cases 
where such axiomatizations are possible) to a sequel. The rest of this paper is 
organized as follows. The next section describes the languages and the various 
kinds of interpreted systems discussed above in detail. In Section 3 we present all 
our lower bound results for the languages CKL,,, and CKB,,,, m 2 2, while in Sec- 
tion 4 we consider the situation for the languages without common knowledge. We 
conclude in Section 5 with some of the philosophical implications of these results. 
2. THE FORMAL MODEL: LANGUAGE AND SYSTEMS 
The logics we are considering are all propositional. Thus, we start out with 
primitive propositions p, q, . . . and we close the logics under negation and con- 
junction, so that if cp and $ are formulas, so are wcp and cp A JI. In addition, we 
close off under modalities for knowledge and time, as discussed below. As usual, we 
view true as an abbreviation for - (p A -p), rp v $ as an abbreviation for 
-(-cp A - $), and cp * II/ as an abbreviation for - cp v ti. We assume that A and 
v bind more tightly than *, so that we write, for example, cp + $ A $’ rather than 
cP=‘(‘h A 1(/‘). 
If we have m agents (in distributed systems applications, this would mean a 
system with m processors), we add the modalities K,, . . . . K,. Thus, if cp is a for- 
mula, so is K,cp (read “processor i knows cp”). In some case we also want to talk 
about common knowledge, so we add the modalities E and C into the language; Ecp 
says that everyone knows cp, while Cq says cp is common knowledge. 
The temporal modalities (sometimes called operators or connectiues) that we use 
depend on whether we are considering linear time or branching time. In the linear 
time case, we have a unary operator 0 and a binary operator U. Thus, if cp and $ 
are formulas, then so are 0~ (read nexttime cp) and cp U + (read cp until +). We 
view 0 cp as an abbreviation for true U cp, while 0 cp is an abbreviation for - 0 IV cp. 
Intuitively, 0~ says that cp is true at the next point (one time unit later), cp U II/ 
says that cp holds until 1(1 does, 0~ says that cp is eventually true (either in the 
present or at some point in the future), and 0~ says that cp is always true (in the 
present and at all points in the future). In the branching time case, we also have 
quantifiers over runs, so that if cp and $ are formulas, so are Vq U ti, 3~ U $, VOcp, 
and 3 0~. A formula of the form VO rp is true at the point (r, n) if Oq is true at 
(r’, n) for all runs r’ extending (r, n), where the notion of extending will be made 
precise below. Similarly, 3~ U @ is true at (r, n) if cp U $ is true at (r’, n) for some 
run r’ extending r. Again, we view V 0 cp (resp. 3 0 cp) as an abbreviation for 
VtrueUq (resp. BrueUcp), and VOcp (resp. 30~) as an abbreviation for -30 -cp 
(resp. NV 0 - cp). Thus, for example, VO cp is true at the point (r, n) if cp is even- 
tually true for all runs r’ extending (r, n). It has been argued that a nexttime 
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operator (0) is inappropriate for reasoning about asynchronus systems 
(cf. [Lal]); after all, the processors do not have access to an external clock in such 
systems, so it is not even clear that the notion of the ticking of such a clock makes 
sense. We remark that all our lower bounds also hold if the language does not have 
a nexttime operator.’ 
As we mentioned in the Introduction, we take 1~1 to be the length of the formula 
cp viewed as a string of symbols, while in the languages without C and E (i.e., KL(,) 
and KB,,,) we define ad(cp) to be the greatest number of alternations of distinct K,‘s 
along any branch in cp’s parse tree. For example, ad(K, - K, K, p) = 3; temporal 
operators do not count, so that ad(K, 0 K, p) = 1. Note that ad(cp) < 1~1, and if cp 
is in KL(,, or KB(,,, then ad(cp)b 1. 
A system for m processors consists of a set R of runs, where each run r E R is a 
function from N to L”, where L is some set of local states. Thus, r(n) has the form 
(I,, . . . . I,,,); such a tuple is called a global state. (Formally, we could view a system 
as a tuple (R, L, m), making the L and m explicit; we have chosen not to do so in 
order to simplify notation. The L and m should always be clear from context.) An 
interpreted system A4 for m processors is a tuple (R, TC), where R is a system for 
m processor and 71 maps every point (r, n) E R x N to a truth assignment z(r, n) on 
primitive propositions (so that x(r, n)(p) E {true, false} for each primitive 
proposition p). 
We now give semantics to CKL,,, and KL(,). Given an interpreted system 
M= (R, n), we write (M, r, n) k cp if the formula cp is true at (or satisfied by) the 
point (r, n) of interpreted system M. We define + inductively for formulas of 
CKL(,) (for KL,,, we just omit the clauses involving C and E). In order to give the 
semantics for formulas of the form K,cp, we need to introduce one new notion. If 
r(n) = (11, . . . . I,), r’(n’) = (I;, . . . . r:,), and Zi = Z:, then we say that r(n) and r’(n’) 
are indistinguishable to processor i and write (r, n) -i (r’, n’). Of course, N i is an 
equivalence relation on global states. K,q will be defined to be true at (r, n) exactly 
if cp is true at all the points whose associated global state is indistinguishable to i 
from that of (r, n). We proceed as follows: 
l (M, r, n) /= p for a primitive proposition p iff z(r, n)(p) = true 
l (M,r,n)~rp~II/iff(M,r,n)~:and(M,r,n)~* 
l W,r,n)k -~iffW,r,n)k+f 
l (M, r, n) + K,cp iff (M, r’, n’) k q for all (r’, n’) such that (r, n) wi (r’, n’) 
5 The G, F, and U operators of [PR] correspond to our VU, VO, and VU, respectively. Parikh and 
Ramanujam do not have a nexttime operator in their language. The 0, q *, 0, and 0* of [LR] 
correspond to our VO, t/Cl, 3 0, and 3 0, respectively. Ladner and Reif have neither VO nor an until 
operator. All our results are easily seen to hold for these restricted languages. We could, of course, also 
allow more complicated mixtures of modalities, such as VO 09, as in the logics CTL* [EH2] or MPL 
[Ab]. Doing this seems to increase the complexity of the decision procedure by at least one exponential 
(cf. [VS]). 
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l (M, r, n) b E~J iff (M, r’, n’) k Kicp for i= 1, . . . . m 
l (44, r, n) k Cp iff (M, r’, n’) k Ekq, for k= 1,2, . . . (where E’q = Eq and 
Ek+$=EEkq) 
l (M,r,n) k Oq iff(M,r,n+l) t= rp 
l (M, r, n) k cp U $ iff there is some n’ > n such that (M, r, n’) k J/, and for 
all n” with n <n” <n’, we have (M, r, n”) k cp. 
There is a graphical interpretation of the semantics of Ek and C which we shall 
find useful in the sequel. Fix an interpreted system M. We say a point (r’, n’) in M 
is reachable from a point (r, n) in k steps if there exist points (ro, n,), . . . . (rk, nk) 
such that (r, n) = (ro, n,), (r’, n’) = (rk, nk), and for all j= 0, . . . . k- 1 there exists i 
such that (ri,ni) -i(ri+l,nj+, ). We say (r’, n’) is reachable from (r, n) if it is 
reachable in k steps for some k. It is easy to check that (M, r, n) + Ekq iff 
(M, r’, n’) + cp for all points (r’, n’) reachable from (r, n) in k steps, and 
(M, r, n) + Cq iff (M, r’, n’) l= cp for all points (r’, n’) reachable from (r, n). 
We remark here that we could have presented the semantics in a slightly different 
way, more closely related to the standard Kripke semantics for knowledge (see, for 
example, [HM2]). Instead of associating to each point (r, n) the global state r(n), 
we could view points as more abstract entities, without this additional structure. An 
interpreted system would now consist of a set of runs, a truth assignment K, and 
equivalence relations N 1 > ***, - m on the points. The semantics of formulas such as 
Kicp could be defined using these equivalence relations just as above. This approach 
was taken in an earlier version of this paper [HV] and is taken by Lehmann 
[Lel]. The two definitions are equivalent in an obvious way: once we associate a 
global state with each point in such a way that two points are indistinguishable to i 
iff they are equivalent. We will use this observation in a number of our proofs 
global state with each point in suchqa way that two points are indistinguishable to i 
iff they are equivalent. We will use this observation in a number of our proofs 
below. We have chosen to use global states here in order to emphasize the 
intuitions coming from distributed systems. This choice also allows us to define 
branching time semantics in a natural way. 
Given an interpreted system M = (R, a), we say that r’ E R extends the point 
(r, n) E R x N if r’(n’) = r(n’) for all n’ <n; i.e., if r and r’ go through the same 
sequence of global states up to time n. With this definition, we can now give seman- 
tics to branching time formulas as follows: 
l (M, r, n) k 3 09 iff (M, r’, n + 1) l= cp for some run r’ extending (r, n) 
l (M, r, n) k VOrp iff (M, r’, n+ 1) l= cp for all runs r’ extending (r, n) 
l (M, r, n) /= %p U $ iff for some run r’ extending (r, n) there exists some 
n’ >, n such that (M, r’, n’) k$, and for all n” with n < n” < n’, we have 
(M, r’, n”) I= cp 
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l (M, r, n) + Vlcp U $ iff for all runs r’ extending (r, n) there exists some n’ 2 n 
such that (M, r’, n’) + II/, and for all n” with n 6 n” < n’, we have (A4, r’, n”) k (P.~ 
As usual, we define a formula cp to be valid with respect to a class 9 of interpreted 
systems iff (M, r, n) k cp for all interpreted systems A4 E 9, runs r in M, and times n. 
A formula cp is satisfiable with respect to 9 iff for some ME 9, r, and n we have 
(M, r, n) l= cp. It will often be more convenient for us to consider the satisliability 
problem rather than the validity problem in proving lower bounds. 
We now turn our attention to formally defining the classes of interpreted systems 
discussed in the Introduction. 
We say processor i does not forget in M = (R, x) if all runs r, r’ E R and times n, 
n’, k, if (r, n) - i (r’, n’) and k d n, then there exists k’ 6 n’ such that (r, k) - i (r’, k’). 
In order to motivate this definition, define processor i’s history at the point (r, n) to 
be the sequence lo, . . . . lk of states that processor i takes on in run r up to time n, 
with consecutive repetitions omitted. For example, if from time 0 through 4 in run r 
processor i goes through the sequence Z, 1, I’, Z, I of states, its history at (r, 4) just 
1, I’, 1. Roughly speaking, processor i does not forget if it “remembers” its history. 
More precisely we have 
LEMMA 2.1. Processor i does not forget in a system R iff for all runs r, r’ E R, if 
(r, n) - i (r’, n’) then processor i’s history is the same at (r, n) and (r’, n’). 
Proof: The fact that remembering the history implies no forgetting is immediate 
from the definition. The converse can be proved by a straightforward induction on 
n+n’. 1 
This lemma shows that no forgetting requires an unbounded number of local 
states in general, since processor i may have an infinite number of distinct histories 
in a given system. There is one more observation about systems where processors 
do not forget that we frequently use; this is captured in the following lemma. 
LEMMA 2.2. If processor i does not forget in R and (r, n) -i (r, n’), then 
(r, n) -i (r, n”) for all n” with n <n” <n’. 
Proof: We proceed by induction on n. Note that since (r, n) mi (r, n’) and 
n” <n’, by definition of no forgetting there must be some k G n such that (r, k) wi 
(r, n”). If n = 0, we must have k = n. If n > 0, then if k = n we are done, while if k < n, 
6 The notion of branching time we have defined here differs slightly from that defined in [LR] and an 
earlier version of this paper [HV]. In these papers, the set of runs has a tree-like structure, which 
guarantees that the set is limit closed. As defined here, the set of runs is not necessarily limit closed, 
making it more like Abrahamson’s MPL [Ab] than CTL (see [Em, EH2] for a detailed discussion of 
this issues). In our framework, we can say that a set R of runs is limit closed if, for all runs r, the fact 
that for all n there is a run r, E R extending (r, n) implies that TE R. By imposing the additional 
condition of limit closure on our classes of runs, we get precisely the classes considered in [LR]. This 
condition has no impact on the complexity of the decision procedure, although it does slightly affect the 
axioms for the logic. In practice we would not want to impose this condition since it is easier to consider 
issues of fairness without it. 
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by the induction hypothesis (where k plays the role of n, n plays the role of n”, and 
n” plays the role of n’), it follows that (r, n) - i (r, k), and by transitivity we get 
(r, n)  -i (r, ,“I. I 
A system where processor i does not forget is shown in Fig. 2, where the vertical 
10-u 
.  .  . . . . . . . . . . . .  .  . . . . . 
FIG. 2. A system where processor i does not forget. 
Ni 
lines denote runs (with time 0 at the top) and all points that i cannot distinguish 
are enclosed in the same region. 
In a system where processor i does not learn, we have the opposite situation: If 
(r, n) - i (Y’, n’), then for all k > n there must be some k’ > n’ such that (r, k) - i 
(r’, k’). A system where processor i does not forget and does not learn is shown in 
Fig. 3. With no learning, the equivalence relations do not reline. Note how i goes 
r’, 
. ....... . . . . . . . . ....... . . . . . . . . ....... . . . . . . . 
FIG. 3. IG. A system where processor i does not forget and does not learn. 
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through the same sequence of states in all runs it cannot distinguish (modulo stut- 
tering, i.e., the same state repeating at consecutive points). (We remark that if we 
consider no learning but allow forgetting, the situation is slightly more complicated. 
If processor i cannot distinguish (r, 0) and (r’, 0), then there may be a set S of states 
such that i is in every state of S infinitely often in both runs r and r’, but it does not 
go through the states in the same sequence in r and r’.) 
In a synchronous system, we assume that every processor has access to a global 
clock that ticks at every instant of time, and the clock reading is part of its state. 
Thus, in a synchronous system, each processor always “knows” the time. More for- 
mally, we say a time is synchronous in R if for all processors i and all runs r, r’, if 
(r, n) - i (r’, n’), then n = n’. We remark that in a previous version of this paper 
[HV], we took a slightly weaker definition: we required that for all runs r, if 
(r, n) wi (r, n’) then n = n’. Let us call a system that satisfies that latter condition 
weakly synchronous. Note that the definition of weakly synchronous only considers 
one run r rather than two runs r and r’. It is easy to show (by induction on n) that 
the two definitions are equivalent for systems where processors do not forget. 
However, in general they are different. (We remark that the notion of weak syn- 
chrony is important in some of our proofs.) Observe that in a synchronous system 
where (r, n) -i (r’, n), an easy induction on n shows that if i does not forget and 
n>O, then (r,n-l)mi (r’, n - 1 ), while if i does not learn, then (r, n + 1) - , 
(r’, n + 1). 
Finally, we say that a system R has a unique initial state if for all runs r, r’ E R, we 
have r(0) = r’(0). Thus, if R is a system with a unique initial state, then we have 
(r, 0) - i (r’, 0) for all runs r, r’ in R and all processors i. 
We say that M= (R, 71) is an interpreted system where processors do not forget 
(resp. processors do not learn, time is synchronous, there is a unique initial state) 
exactly if R is a system with that property. As we mentioned in the Introduction, we 
use the notation % to represent the class of all interpreted systems, and add the 
subscripts nf, nl, S~MC, and uis to denote particular subclasses of %?. 
3. LOWER BOUNDS FOR CKL,,, AND CKB,,, 
In this section we prove the results claimed in the Introduction on the complexity 
of the validity problem for CKL,,, and CKB,,,,,. 
We begin with a brief review of the notions of n: and its dual xi. Further details 
can be found in [Rog] or any other standard textbook of recursive function theory. 
Formulas of second-order arithmetic with set variables consist of formulas of lirst- 
order arithmetic, augmented with expressions of the form x E X, where x is a num- 
ber variable and X is a set variable, together with quantification over set variables 
and number variables. A sentence is a formula with no free variables. Second-order 
arithmetic with set variables is a very powerful language. For example, the follow- 
ing (true) sentence of the language expresses the law of mathematical induction 
over N: 
VX(0 E x A VX((XE x= x + 1 E X) * VX(XE X))). 
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A JJ: sentence (resp. Ci sentence) of second-order arithmetic with set variables is 
one of the form VX, . .+ VX,(p (resp. 3X1 . . .3X, cp), where cp is a formula of second- 
order arithmetic with set variables that has no quantification over set variables. A 
set A of natural numbers is in ni (resp. xi) exactly if there is a ni sentence (resp. 
Ci sentence) $(x) with one free number variable x and no free set variables such 
that a EA iff $(a) is true. n:-hardness and n:-completeness are defined in the 
obvious way (the reduction is via one-one recursive functions). It is well known 
that ni-complete sets are not recursively enumerable (cf. [Rog] ). In particular, it 
follows from the fact that the validity problem for both CKL(,) and CKB,,,, m > 2, 
is ni-complete that there can be no complete (recursive) axiomatization for these 
languages. 
For all the ni lower bound proofs, we use the following result, due to Harel, 
Pnueli, and Stavi [HPS]. We say that a Turing machine A is recurrent if, when 
started on the empty tape, it has an infinite computation that reenters its start state 
infinitely often. Let A,, A,, . . . be a recursive enumeration of the nondeterministic 
Turing machines with one tape, infinite to the right. 
PROPOSITION 3.1. The set {n 1 A,, is recurrent} is xi-complete. 
We now state and prove our first fl: lower bound result, which focuses on syn- 
chronous systems. We then show how the result can be extended to classes of 
systems that are not necessarily synchronous. The matching upper bound results 
are relatively straightforward; the proof can be found in part II of this paper. 
THEOREM 3.2. The validity problem for CKL,,, and CKB,,,, m > 2, is n:-hard 
with respect to the following classes of interpreted systems: GF?~+~,,~,, %~(nT,sync,uis,, 
97 (nl,sync)T and ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Proof. The idea is to show how to encode the computation of an arbitrary 
Turing machine m a CKL(,, formula. Roughly speaking, we show that given a 
one-tape, infinite to the right, nondeterministic Turing machine A, we can construct 
a CKL,,, formula (P* such that for an interpreted system MES?&~~~) (resp. 
59 (nf, sync, uis) v (nl,sync)? (e,,f,n,,,y,,,) we have (M, r, 0) + (P* iff, for each n, the “nth 
level” of M (i.e., the points of ii4 of the form (r’, n)) encodes a possible situation 
after n steps of a computation of A when started on a blank tape, in a sense to be 
made clear below. 
In order to understand the idea (and the difficulties!) of our construction, it is 
instructive to recall the proof that two-dimensional temporal logic is I-Ii-hard 
[HPV, Har]. In two-dimensional temporal logic, the structures are two-dimen- 
sional grids, infinite to the right and downwards. Thus, a point in a structure is just 
a pair (i, j) of natural numbers. There are four temporal operators: 0 r, 0 I, 0 d, 
and q d. The formula O,cp says that cp is true one step to the right, while 0 rep says 
cp is true everywhere to the right. Similarly, 0 d cp says that rp is true one step down, 
while q ,cp says that cp is true everywhere below the given point. Thus, for example, 
(M, i,j) + O,cp if (M, i+ 1,j) k cp and (M, i,j) l= q ,cp if (M, i,j’) l= cp for all 
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j’>j. It is easy to encode the computation of Turing machines in this structure. 
Every row represents an ID (instantaneous description); consecutive rows represent 
consecutive ID’s of the computation. Using Cl, we can easily say the start state 
appears infinitely often in the computation. 
In CKL(,,, we can use 0 and 0 to play the same role as Od and 0,. It might 
seem that we could use K, to play the role of 0, and then C could play the role of 
Cl,. This will not quite work. The problem is that, since - i is an equivalence 
relation, K, has the property that K, p *K, K, p. Intuitively, you can not get 
anywhere by taking many K, “steps” that you could not already get to by taking 
one K, step. We solve this problem by using the modal operators K, and K, 
together with a special primitive proposition pd (which is used to mark the fact that 
a change has taken place) to play the role of 0,. We replace a formula of the form 
O,cp by one of the form K,( -pd 3 K2(pA = cp)). Thus, taking a K, step to a point 
where -pd holds, followed by a K2 step to a point where pd holds, corresponds to 
taking a 0, step. (This is why we need at least two processors to get our nf 
result.) We then use C to play the role of q ,, as suggested above. 
Another difference between systems and structures of two-dimensional temporal 
logic is that the latter have the “grid” property. For every pair (i, j), (i + 1, j) of 
consecutive nodes at the ‘7th level,” there is a corresponding pair (i, j + 1 ), 
(i+ 1, j+ 1) of consecutive nodes at the (j+ 1)th level. This property is crucial to 
being able to encode the fact that consecutive ID’s “match up right.” No forgetting 
and no learning each give us half of the grid property in synchronous systems. With 
no forgetting we have (r, n + 1) mi (r’, n + 1) implies (r, n) -i (r’, n), while with no 
learning we have (r, n) - i (r’, n) implies (r, n + 1) - i (r’, n + 1). Showing that either 
half of the grid property suffices to encode the computation of a Turing machine 
makes up the heart of our proof. (This is exactly why we cannot straightforwardly 
apply the techniques of [HPV, Har], as is done, for example, in [RS].) 
We proceed as follows. For the remainder of this proof, we fix a Turing machine 
A. Suppose A has state space S and uses tape alphabet K We use the special sym- 
bol # to denote the left-hand end of the tape, and b to denote a blank cell of the 
tape. We assume that # , b $ ZY Let CD (for cell descriptor) be TV (b, # > u 
(f x S). Thus, an ID is always of the form #xbbb..., where x is a finite string of sym- 
bols in CD. Corresponding to every symbol c E CD we have a primitive proposition 
pC. If c = (y, s) E TX S then the primitive proposition p, is meant to denote a cell of 
the tape which has symbol y and is currently being read by the head, while A is in 
state s. Finally, as mentioned above, we use a special primitive proposition pd to 
mark the change to a new cell. 
(P* will consist of the conjunction of a number of formulas, which we now 
describe. Let cpi be the formula: 
Thus, if (M, r, no) /= ‘pl, then for all n b no, exactly one cell descriptor holds of any 
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point reachable from (r, n). (Our comments here and below hold whether M is in 
%z (nf, sync) 7 %(ig, sync, uis) 3 Gfz (nl,sync)9 or (iSnf,nl,sync). 1 
Let cpz be the formula 
If (M, r, no) l= (p2, then the truth value of pA is constant below any point reachable 
from (r,n) for nan,. 
Next, let (p3 be the formula 
If (M, r, n,) + cp3, then for any (r’, n) reachable from (r, I?), n 2 n,, there are points 
(rl, n) and (r2, n) such that (r’, n) ml (rlr n), (r’, n) w2 (r2, n), (M rl, n) t== -PA, 
and (M r2, n) k pA. 
Given an interpreted system A4, a run r in M, and k B 0, we will say a level k 
alternating sequence of runs starting with (r, n,,) is a sequence ro, r,, . . . of runs such 
that (a) r=r,,, (b) (r2j, n~+k) -1 (ry+lp no+kh (c) try+13 no+k) ~2 
(r*j+2, no+k), (d) (Kry,no+k) FP~, (e) (Kry+I,no+k) t=-~d. 
If (M, r, no) l= (p3, then for all k > 0 there will be an infinite level k alternating 
sequence of runs starting with (r, no). Moreover, if (M, r, no) l= ‘p2 and M is in 
59 (nf,sync)~ 9? (nf, sync, uis) 9 or %?c,f,.,,,ync), then the half of the grid property that holds with 
no forgetting guarantees that if ro, rl, . . . is a level k + 1 alternating sequence of runs 
starting with (r, no), then it is also a level k alternating sequence of runs. (This is 
true since no forgetting implies that for all j, if (rj, k + 1) - i (rj+ , , k + 1) then 
(rj, k) wi (rj+ 1, k).) Similarly, if M is in %‘c(n,,sync) or %t(nf,n,,sync), then if ro, rl, . . . is a 
level k alternating sequence of runs starting with (r, no), then it is also a level k + 1 
alternating sequence of runs. 
We intend to encode ID’s (instantaneous descriptions) of the Turing machine A 
along these alternating sequences of runs. The kth ID of some computation of A 
will be encoded at the points of a level k alternating sequence of runs that satisfy 
pd. More formally, what we are aiming for is to find a formula 1(/ such that if 
(M, r, no) l= ~5 then the following property holds: 
There is a computation camp of A started on the empty string such that 
for all k >, 0, there exists a level k alternating sequence of runs ro, r i, . . . 
starting with (r, no), such that for all c ECD, we have 
(M, ry, no + k) k pC iff c is in the jth cell after the kth step of camp. (*I 
The situation that we are trying to capture in (*) is shown in Fig. 4, where cjk 
denotes the contents of the jth cell after the kth step of camp. The lack of the full 
grid property will make it somewhat more difficult to find such a formula II/, but we 
now show it can be done. 
210 HALPERN AND VARDI 
co1 1 L 2 d.cll 1 2 
(r0,m0+ 1) (r19n0+l> (r2sn0+l) (r3n0+1) 
:: %.. 
(ro0+ 1) 
co2 1 2 . . cl2 1 2 
(rotno+ h*no+2) (r2Bn0+2) b-3+0+2) 
:; Q?.. 
(ro0+2) 
i 
FIG. 4. Encoding a computation by (*). 
Suppose s,, is the initial state of A. Let (p4 be the formula 
P# A PA A KI( -PA * h(PA *P(b& * K,( -PA * &(PA *Pb)))) 
A c(PA A Pb =+ K,( -PA * &(PA *Pb)). 
(p4 guarantees that the computation “starts right,” with a blank tape and A in state 
sO. (Note that the last conjunct forces blanks everywhere past the second cell.) 
We now have to make sure that consecutive ID’s in the computation match up 
right. It is well known that we can characterize a Turing machine by giving a 
function which, given three consecutive cells in an ID, describes the set of possible 
corresponding three cells in the next ID. Thus, given the Turing machine A and i, j, 
k E CD with there is a function N such that 
N( i, j, k) = { (c, d, e) 1 if i, j, k describes three consecutive cells in a given ID then 
(c, d, e ) is a possible description of the corresponding cells 
in the next ID}. 
Let ‘ps be the formula 
q c i,j.,?CD ( ( ( 
PA APif’ KI(~PA*Kz(PA*PJ-~ KI(~PA*~z(PA*P/c))))) 
e- V o(p, A K,( -PA =- &(pA *PC, h KI( -PA * K2bA =P,))))) . <c.d,e>EWi,j,k) 
Let $ be the conjunction of cp, through cps. 
LEMMA 3.3. If ME ‘%csync) Wp. ~w,n~.sync)~ g((nf,sync,uis), ~~(n~,sync)) and 
(M, r, no) + $, then ( * ) holds. 
Proof We first consider the case where we have no learning, so that A4 is in 
59 (nl,sync) or ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ BY cp3, there is some level 0 alternating sequence of runs 
REASONING ABOUT KNOWLEDGE AND TIME 211 
starting with (r, n,), say r,,, r,, . . . . As observed above, by ‘pz together with the 
assumption of no learning, rO, r i , . . . is actually a level k alternating sequence of runs 
starting with (r, n,) for all k. By ‘pl and (p4, at level 0 this sequence encodes the 
initial ID, where the tape is blank and A starts in state so. Using cpi and (ps, it is 
easy to show by induction on k that there is a computation camp of A such that at 
level k, this sequence encodes the kth step of camp. 
If M is in %f,syncj or w(*f,sync,uis) we have to work a little harder. In fact, we first 
prove the followmg version of (*): 
For all level k alternating sequences of runs rO, rl, . . . starting with 
(r, n,), there exists a computation camp of A started on the empty string 
such that for all I< k and all c E CD, we have (M, rzj, n, + I) + pE iff c is 
in the jth cell after the Zth step of camp. (**I 
(**) is proved by induction on k. The case k = 0 follows immediately from cp 1 and 
q4. For the general case, suppose ro, rl, . . . is a level k + 1 alternating sequence of 
runs starting with (r, no). From the assumption of no forgetting, it follows using cpz 
that ro, rIr . . . is also a level k alternating sequence of runs. From the induction 
hypothesis, it follows that this latter sequence of points encodes the kth step of 
some computation of A. Now from ‘p, and ‘ps, it follows that (ro, no + k + 1 ), 
(rI , no + k + 1 ), . . . does indeed encode the (k + 1 )th step of some computation of A. 
This completes the proof of (**). 
By ‘p3 it follows that for all k, there is some level k alternating sequence starting 
with (r, no). We can now construct a tree whose nodes at depth k consist of all kth 
steps of computations encoded by level k alternating sequences in M starting with 
(r, no). We put an edge between a depth k node and a depth k + 1 node exactly if 
there is a computation camp such that these nodes encode the kth and (k + 1)th 
steps of camp. It is easy to see that the tree so constructed is finitely branching and, 
by (**) and the fact that we have level k alternating sequences for all k, it has 
arbitrarily long paths. By Konig’s lemma, there must be. an infinitely long path in 
the tree. (*) now follows. 1 
We are almost done. We just need one more formula to say that A is recurrent; 
i.e., that there is some computation camp where A reenters the start state so 
infinitely often. Note that it would be consistent with $ that several computations 
of A were being simultaneously encoded by different level k alternating sequences of 
runs. Since we want to make sure that there is one particular computation camp 
where A does reenter the start state infinitely often, we require that infinitely often 
all the computations being encoded by M are in the start state. This is the job 
of (pe: 
q o (wcmCc~i!{s~) “> A cw(c~~x,!~i+O) “>>* 
(Recall that 0 is the dual of 0, so that 0 JI is an abbreviation for - 0 - $.) Let 
qa be the conjunction of cpl through cps. 
571/38/l-14 
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LEMMA 3.4. The formula qA is satisfiable in an interpreted system ~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
(rev. ~~nf,n~,sync)~ g(nf,sync,uis)r %I,~,,,J ) iff A, when started on a blank tape, admits an 
infinite computation which reenters its start state infinitely often. 
Proof: Suppose (M, r, n) t= (Pi for some interpreted system ME%Y~~~,~~“~, (resp. 
v (nf, Ill, sync) 59 (nf,sync.uis)~ v (n,,syncJ By Lemma 3.3, it follows that (*) holds. Thus, M 
encodes a computation of A in the sense of (*). Moreover, qp6 guarantees that in 
this infinite computation, A enters the start state infinitely often. 
Conversely, suppose that A is recurrent. We first construct an interpreted system 
M,4 = CR, 3 J-c,41 E ~((nf,nLsync) for two processors and a run r,, of M such that 
(M ro, 1) k qPA. Since %t”(nf,nl,sync) = %?cnl,sync)  +?~(nl,sync), this also gives us the desired 
result for %f,sync) and %,l,sync). 
We take R, to consist of the runs ro, rl, r2, . . . . Let the processor’s local states be 
of the form (j, n) (j and n integers), and define rj(n)= ((Lj/2_(, n), ([j/21, n)). 
Thus, we have (ryr n) -, (rzi+l, n) and (rzj+ i, n) -Z (r2j+2, n). Note that this 
definition guarantees that the processors do not forget and do not learn. Given this 
definition, we can view the system as a two-dimensional grid, with edges labelled 1 
alternating with edges labelled 2. Let camp be a computation where A reenters the 
start state infinitely often. We deline zA so that this computation is encoded by the 
interpreted system M, in the sense of (*). In particular, we define nA so that: 
1. For c E CD, we have that pC is true at the point (rzj, n + 1) iff c is in the jth 
cell after the nth step of the computation of camp, 
2. pd is true at points of the form (rzj, n) and false at points of the form 
(rzj+ 1, n). It is now easy to check that (MA, ro, 1) k (Pi. 
In order to deal with ~((nf,sync,uis), we slightly modify the system R, so that there is 
a unique initial state. For all rj E R,, we take rj(0) = (0,O). This guarantees that 
there is a unique initial state, and we still have that (MA, ro, 1) k (P*. (Note that 
by adding this unique initial state, we have lost the property of no learning, so that 
this trick would not work for Ce(“F,nl,sync,uis).) 1
The l’J: lower bound on validity for the language CKL,,,, m 2 2, now follows. 
We briefly sketch the modifications required to deal with CKB,,,. We first replace 
all occurrences of 0 (resp. 0) in (pi, i= 1, . . . . 5, by VO(resp. VU). Call the 
resulting formulas rpp”, and let eb be the conjunction of these formulas. We leave it 
to the reader to check that the analog of Lemma 3.3 holds for tib. Let ‘pi be 
VOVO(-C- (Vrorr~sO~Pc) A C- Wcsrx ~s,lrzo~ PA), and let cpi be the con- 
junction of (pi through cpi. Then the analog of Lemma 3.4 holds for (pi. (However, 
note that we need VO in cpi rather than 30 in order to guarantee recurrence if we 
allow learning.) 1 
Remark. It may seem that in order to be able to encode the computation of 
arbitrary Turing machines in the language, we need an infinite number of primitive 
propositions (since the number of primitive propositions used to encode the 
computation of A in the proof above is greater than the number of states in A). 
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However, it is easy to see that we can encode the computation of arbitrary Turing 
machines using only two primitive propositions and a slightly more sophisticated 
encoding. There are also some situations where we may want to restrict the inter- 
preted system so that the truth value of primitive propositions is stable along all 
runs; i.e., for all primitive propositions p, the formula Up v 0 -p is valid. This is 
one of the assumptions considered, for example, in [FHV2]. Ron Fagin has 
pointed out that even with this assumption, our n: lower bound still holds, 
although we seem to require at least three agents in this case. The idea is to replace 
each use of a primitive proposition p in our encoding by the formula K, - K3 p. We 
omit details here. 1 
For the classes ~c(n~), qcn~,n~), and q((nf,uis), where we no longer assume time is 
synchronous but do still assume that we have no forgetting, it is easy to modify the 
previous proof to again get a n: lower bound. In fact, we can do this in a uniform 
way; we construct a formula that essentially forces synchrony. More formally, we 
have 
PROPOSITION 3.5. For all formulas rp in CKL,,, (resp. CKB,,,), there is a 
formula sync, such that cp is satisfiable with respect to %‘~nT,sync, (resp. %?~(nl,n,,sync,, 
$9 (nf,sync,uis)) if and only if q A sync,+, is satisfiable with respect to %& (resp. 
(e(nf,nl), Gf? )* (nf.uis) 
Proof. Let rp be a formula in CKL,,,. Let tick be a new primitive proposition 
(not appearing in cp), and let sync, be the formula: 
C Cl ((tick*Ctick) A (-tick-C-tick)) 
A C q ((tick* O-tick) A (-tick* Otick)). 
Thus, sync, says that the truth value of tick is always common knowledge, and that 
its truth value changes at consecutive points along any run (we can think of a 
change in the value of tick as denoting one tick of a global clock). Note that the 
only dependence of sync, on cp is in the choice of the primitive proposition tick. 
Now suppose that cp is satisfied in some interpreted system M in %$,,,,,,,, (resp. 
%? (nf,nl,sync)~ %? (nl,sync,uis)). Since tick does not appear in cp, we can assume without loss 
of generality that tick is true at all points in A4 of the form (r, 2n) and false at all 
other points. Clearly cp A sync, is then satisfied in M. This gives us one direction of 
the result. 
For the converse, suppose M= (R, z) is in %Zcnr, and (M, rO, no) b cp A sync, for 
some point (r,,, n,) in M. We now show that sync, essentially forces the system to 
be weakly synchronous. For suppose not. Then there must be two points (r, n) and 
(r, n’) with n’>n such that (r, n) -i (r, n’), for some agent i. Because we are 
assuming no forgetting, by Lemma 2.2 it follows that (r, n) wi (r, n”) for all n” with 
n G n” <n’. (Note the key use of no forgetting here.) Since tick changes its truth 
value at every step, in particular, it must be the case that tick has different truth 
values at (r, n) and (r, n + 1). But we have just shown that (r, n) and (r, n + 1) are 
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indistinguishable, which contradicts the assumption that the truth value of tick is 
common knowledge. Thus, the system (or at least that part of it below points 
reachable from (r,,, n,)) is weakly synchronous. It is also not hard to show that in 
the weakly synchronous part of ii4, if (r, n) - i (r’, n’) and n > 0, then (r, n - 1) - i 
(r’, n’ - 1). Thus, we have the situation shown in Fig. 5. We can now convert the 
weakly synchronous system to a synchronous system by chopping off the prefixes of 
runs. 
Formally, we proceed as follows. Let R’ consist of all runs reachable from (rO, n,) 
and, for all r E R’, let (r, n,) be the first point in r reachable from (ro, n,). Let f be a 
function on the runs in R’ defined by f(r)(n) = r(n, + n). Thus, f(r) is the result of 
chopping off the prefix of r before n, and relabelling the points so that we start with 
0. Let M’ = (f(R’), x’), where rc’( f(r), n) = rc r, n, + n) for r E R’. An easy induction (
now shows that for r E R’ and all formulas I++, we have (M’, f(r), n) + $ iff 
(M, r, n + n,) l= +. We next show that for r, r’ E R’ and k k 0, if (r, n, + k) w, 
(r’, n: + k’), then k = k’. We prove the result by induction on k. It suffices to show 
that k 6 k’; equality follows by the symmetry of - i. For the case k = 0 the result is 
immediate by the definition of n,.. Suppose k > 0. By the assumption of no forget- 
ting, it follows that r(n, + k- 1) -i r’(n,. + k”) for some k” <k’. By the induction 
hypothesis, it follows that k - 1 <k”. Now we must only show that in fact k” <k’ 
and we will get k B k’, as desired. Note that if k” = k’ (the only other possibility), 
then by the transitivity of zi we get r(n,+ k- 1) wir(n,+ k). Observe that 
since the formula sync, is prefixed by CO, it follows from the construction 
that (M, r, n, + k - 1) k sync,. Suppose, without loss of generality, that 
(M, r, n, + k - 1) b tick. Since sync, forces the truth value of tick to alternate along 
a run, it follows that (M, r, n, + k - 1) + tick. But sync, also forces the truth value 
of tick to be common knowledge, which contradicts the observation that 
r(n, + k - 1) ‘vi r(n, + k). This proves the desired result. 
It now easily follows that (f(r), k) - ; (f (r’), k’) implies k = k’. Moreover, we get 
that processors do not forget in M’, since if (f(r), n) wi (f(r’), n) and k 6 n, then 
by construction we have (r, n, + n) N i (r’, n,, + n). Since processors do not forget in 
M, we must have some k’ such that (r, n, + k) wi (r’, n,. + k’). By the previous 
observation we have k=k’, so that (f(r),k) -;(f(r’),k). Thus ME%‘~“~,~~~~,. 
FIG. 5. An interpreted system M where (M, ro, no) /= sync,. 
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A similar proof works in the case of ME %c(nf,nlj. For the case ME ‘Xcnr,+is), we 
proceed as above, and then add an initial state as in the proof of Lemma 3.4. 
Finally, if cp is in the language CKB,,,, we construct sync, using VU and VO 
rather than 0 and 0. 1 
COROLLARY 3.6. The validity problem for CKL,,, and CKB,,,, m > 2, is 
n:-hard with respect to the following classes of interpreted systems: G&,, %&,,,, and 
% (nf,uis)* 
Proof. Consider the formula (P* A sync,,. By Proposition 3.5, this formula is 
satisfiable with respect to ‘ik;,rj (resp. ~~,,f,nlj, %c(nr,uis) ) iff (P* is satisfiable with respect 
to g(:(nf,syncj (rev. ~~(nf,nl,sync~~ g((nf,sync.uis)h and by the proof of Theorem 3.2, this 
holds iff A is recurrent. This observation gives us the lower bound. i 
In the formula qPA A sync,* above, we make heavy use of the nexttime operator 
(0 ). As Lamport has argued [La1 1, it is somewhat unreasonable to have a 
nexttime operator in the language if we are considering asynchronous systems. In 
fact, this use of the nexttime operator is unnecessary. The reader is referred to the 
Appendix for details. 
In the previous proof where we eliminated the assumption of synchrony, we 
made heavy use of our assumption of no forgetting. The proof does not go through 
if we only assume no learning. Nevertheless, as we now show, we can still make use 
of these ideas in the presence of no learning. 
Given an interpreted system M, we say a point (r, n) in A4 is i-repeating if there 
exist infinitely many n’ > n such that (r, n) - i (r, n’). 
LEMMA 3.7. Let M= (R, x) be an interpreted system in WC,,,, (resp. GIFZ’~~,,~~~,) and 
let r, r’ E R. 
1. Zf no <n, <n2, (r, n,) wi (r, n2), and it is not the case that (r, n,) -i (r, n2), 
then both (r, n,) and (r, n, ) are i-repeating. 
2. Zf (r, n) wi (r, n’), n <n’, and (r, n’) is not i-repeating, then (r, n) wi (r, n”) 
for all n” with n < n” <n’. 
3. Zf (r, n) is i-repeating and n’ > n, then (r, n’) is i-repeating. 
4. [f (r, n) -i (r’, n’), then (r, n) is i-repeating iff (r’, n’) is i-repeating. 
Proof. For part 1, we extend n,, n,, n, to a sequence (nj), j> 0, such that 
nj<nj+~T (r,nd -i(r,nd, and (r,nZk+l) w i (r, n,). The existence of such a 
sequence is almost immediate from the assumption of no learning. For example, 
since (r, n,) Ni (r, n2) an d n, > n, by assumption, there must exist n3 2 n, such that 
(r, n,) mi (r, n3). We cannot have n3 =nz since it is not the case that (r, n2) N i 
(r, nl). The rest of the construction continues in the same way. The existence of such 
a sequence shows that (r, no) and (r, n,) are both i-repeating. 
For part 2, note that if n < n” < n’ and it is not the case that (r, n) N i (r, n”), then 
by part 1, (r, n’) is i-repeating, contradicting our original assumption. 
216 HALPERNAND VARDI 
For part 3, observe the result is immediate if (r, n) - I (r, n’). If not, since (r, n) is 
i-repeating, there must exist n” > n’ such that (r, n) -i (r, n”). The result now 
follows from part 1. 
For part 4, suppose that (r, n) is i-repeating. We now show that (r’, n’) is 
i-repeating. Suppose not. Then there is some k’ > n’ such that for all n” k k’, it is 
not the case that (r’, n’) hi (r’, n”). By the assumption of no learning, there is some 
k > n such that (r, k) - i (r’, k’). Since (r, n) is i-repeating, it must be the case that 
for some I > k, we have (r, 1) -i (r, n). By the assumption of no learning again, we 
must have some 1’ 2 k’ such that (r, I) -i (r’, I’). By the transitivity of - i, it follows 
that (r’, I’) wi (r’, n’). But this contradicts our choice of k. Thus, (r’, n’) is 
i-repeating. Part 4 now follows by the symmetry of wi. i 
Note that, among other things, this lemma tells us that in the non-i-repeating 
part of a run, we essentially have the property described in Lemma 2.2. This was 
the main property we needed to force synchrony in Proposition 3.5. We cannot 
quite force synchrony in systems with no learning, but we can come close enough to 
get the ni lower bound, as the following result shows. 
THEOREM 3.8. The validity problem for CKL,,, and CKB,,,, m > 2, is n:-hard 
with respect to %(“,,. 
Proof: We slightly modify the construction of (P* given in Theorem 3.2 to again 
get a formula ‘it that encodes the computation of the TM A in the nonrepeating 
part of runs. We proceed as follows. 
Let q be a new primitive proposition (not appearing in (P*) and let nonrep be an 
abbreviation q A 0 0 -9. It is easy to see that Ki(nonrep) is true at the point (r, n) 
only if (r, n) is not i-repeating. 
Essentialy the same argument used in Proposition 3.5 shows that the formula 
sync,, constructed in that proof also forces weak synchrony in the nonrepeating 
part of any interpreted system in G$i,. Formally, if ME%&,,, (r, n) -i (r, n’), (r, n’) 
is not an i-repeating point, and (M, r, n) b sync,*, then n = n’. To see this, suppose 
by way of contradiction that n’>n. Note that by part 2 of Lemma 3.7, we must 
have (r, n) N i (r, n + 1). Since sync,, forces the truth value of tick at (r, n) to be 
common knowledge and to change at every step, this leads us to a contradiction, 
just as in the proof of Proposition 3.5. The situation is now essentially that 
described in Fig. 5. 
At this point there are still two problems to be dealt with before we can run 
through the proof of Theorem 3.2. The first is that we cannot now delete the prefix 
of each run as we did in the proof of Proposition 3.5 in order to get a synchronous 
system. The problem is that we may well have (r, n) - i (r’, n’) and (r, n) wz 
(r’, n”), with n’ Zn”. (As the proof of Proposition 3.5 shows, this can not happen if 
we make the assumption of no forgetting; it can happen with no learning.) It turns 
out that weak synchrony is enough for our purposes; we just need to appropriately 
modify the statement (*) from the proof of Theorem 3.2. 
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A more serious problem is that we cannot use the formula nonrep to force all the 
points in a run to be non-i-repeating. The reason is that q !Ki(nonrep) is 
unsatisfiable (in fact, q (nonrep) is unsatisfiable). We deal with this problem by 
offsetting the computation by one run at each step. More precisely, we construct cpf 
such that if ME %&) and (M, ro, no) k cpf, then the following variant of property 
(*) holds. (The reader should compare the conditions below to those defining a 
level k alternating sequence of runs.) 
There is a computation camp of A started on the empty string and a sequence 
PO7 no), (rl, n,), (r2, n2), . . . of points such that for all k>O we have 
(r2j,n2j+k) ~1 (rzj+l,nzj+l+k), (rzj+l,nzj+l+k) ~2 (rZj+2,nzj+2+k), 
(MY rzj, Q+k) != PA, (M, rzj+l, nU+i +k) k -PA, and for all CECD, 
We have (M, r2(j+k), n2( j+ k) + k) /= pc iff c is in the ith cell after the kth 
step of camp. (+I 
The situation that we are trying to capture in (+ ) is shown in Fig. 6, where cjk 
denotes the contents of the jth cell after the kth step of camp. 
We construct cpf as follows. Let cpo be the formula: 
q c(sync,,) A q c((p# A PA*E(nonrep)) 
A (PA h E(nonrep) - Kl( -PA - K2(pA * E(nonrep))))). 
As our comments above indicate, the first conjunct of ‘p. forces weak synchrony in 
the nonrepeating part. The second conjunct of rp, says that along any sequence 
encoding an ID, all relevant points are nonrepeating. 
NpA NpA PA 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
FIG. 6. Encoding a computation by ( + ). 
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Let 40; be the variant of cps that offsets the computation by one step: 
Let (pi, i= 1,2,3,4,6 be as in the proof of Theorem 3.2, and let ~2 be the 
conjunction of rp,, cp;, and rp,, i= 1,2,3,4,6. Now a similar argument to that used 
in the proof of Theorem 3.2 shows that cpz is satisfiable with respect to %$i) iff A is 
recurrent. The result now follows. The standard modifications now enable us to 
deal with CD?,,, as well. 1 
As we remarked in the Introduction, the combination of no learning and unique 
initial state leads us to some anomalous situations with regard to the complexity of 
the validity problem. As we pointed out in the proof of Lemma 3.4, the 
straightforward trick used to add a unique initial state to a system does not work if 
we require no learning (and are dealing with more than one processor). Indeed, if 
we consider the classes ~~(nf,nl,sync,uis) and ~~~,,,ync,“is), it is easy to show that we get 
no more expressive power with many agents and common knowledge than we do 
with just one agent. More formally, it is easy to show 
PROPOSITION 3.99 1. @(nf,nl,sync,uis) = q((nl,sync,uis). 
2. Any formula cp in CKL,,, (resp. CKB,,,) is equivalent in interpreted systems 
in w((nl,sync.uis) (rw. ‘%;nf.n~,sync,uis~ ) to the formula cp’ that results by replacing all 
occurrences of Ki, i 3 2, E, and C by K, . 
Proof. Clearly we have ~~(nl,nl,sync,uis) c ~~(nl,sync,uis). For the opposite inclusion, 
consider an interpreted system A4 = (R, n) E ~~(nl,sync,uis). The assumption of unique 
initial state guarantees that for all r, r’ G R and all processors i, we have that 
(r, 0) - ; (r’, 0). Since the system is synchronous and there is no learning, it is easy 
to show by induction on n that we have (r, n) -i (r’, n) for all n. It immediately 
follows that processors do not forget. Moreover, an easy induction on the structure 
of cp proves the second part. 1 
Thus, the lower bound for the validity problem with respect to %?~~l,sync,uis~ and 
%? (nf,nl,sync,uis) for the lmwage CKLW ( resp. CKB,,,) is the same as the lower 
bound for KL(,, (resp. Kg,,,), namely EXPSPACE. (We prove this lower bound in 
the next section; the matching upper bound is proved in the sequel to this paper.) 
On the other hand, if we drop the assumption of synchronous time, the situation 
changes drastically. Ladner and Reif [LR] prove that for interpreted systems in 
wcnf. “I. uis) , even the language Kg(,) is undecidable. In particular, they show that the 
computation of a nondeterministic Turing machine can be encoded by a KB(,, for- 
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mula. They do their encoding by laying out the computation of the TM vertically 
down one run, rather than using many runs as we do in the proof of Theorem 3.2. 
(We remark that we also encode computations vertically in the proofs of our non- 
elementary bounds in the next section.) It is straightforward to add a conjunct to 
their formula so that we actually encode the recurrence problem. Other trivial 
modifications allow us to do the encoding by a K&, formula. We omit the details 
here. As a consequence we get: 
THEOREM 3.10. The validity problem for KL,,, and KB,,,, m 2 2, with respect to 
Gf? (nf,nl,uis) is EIi-hard. 
COROLLAR 3.11. The validity problem for CKL(,, and CKB,,,, m > 2, with 
respect to %c(nf.nl,uis) is I-Ii-hard. 
By combining the ideas of Theorem 3.8 and those in Ladner and Reifs proof, we 
can also prove a tight bound for validity with respect to %c(ni,uis). At first glance, it 
might seem that we could just force the run along which the computation of the 
TM is encoded to be nonrepeating, and then proceed as before to encode the non- 
recurrence problem and get a n: lower bound. However, as we pointed out in the 
proof of Theorem 3.8, if we consider the formula Ki(nonrep) that we used to force a 
point to be non-i-repeating, q lKi(nonrep) is unsatisfiable. Thus, we cannot use this 
formula to force a whole run to be non-i-repeating, but only a finite prefix of that 
run. This problem is not just a consequence of the way we defined the formula non- 
rep. As we show in the sequel to this paper, a formula is satisfiable with respect to 
%I, (rev. g((nl,uis) ) iff it is satisfiable with respect to an interpreted system in %$,,, 
bw. w((nl,uis)) in which only a finite prefix of every run is non-i-repeating, for each 
agent i. The fact that only a finite prefix of a run is non-i-repeating suffices to allow 
us to encode the halting problem in a formula, using the techniques of Ladner and 
Reif. As a consequence we get: 
THEOREM 3.12. The validity problem for KL(,,,, and KB,,,, m > 2, with respect to 
qnr, uis) is co-r.e.-hard, 
COROLLAY 3.13. The validity problem for CKL,,, and CKB(,,, m>, 2, with 
respect to v(nl,uis) is co-r.e.-hard. 
We remark that the observations made above also allow us to prove that these 
bounds are tight, and we do so in the sequel to this paper. 
Finally, we consider the situation for classes of interpreted systems where we do 
not assume either no forgetting or no learning. Here the validity problem becomes 
much easier. 
THEOREM 3.14. The validity problem for CKL,,, and CKB,,,, m 2 2, with respect 
to %s, w(sync)9 v((sync,uis), and (ip”is) is EXPTIME-hard. 
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Proof: The result follows immediately from the fact that even without temporal 
operators, the logic with at least two agents and common knowledge is EXPTIME- 
hard [HM2]. 1 
We remark that Fischer and Immerman independently proved the EXPTIME 
result for CKB,,, with respect to 59 [FI2]. 
4. LOWER BOUNDS FOR Z$,, AND Kll(,) 
In order to prove the complexity results discussed in the Introduction for classes 
of interpreted systems with no learning or no forgetting, we first show how we can 
use formulas to encode “yardsticks” of the type used by Stockmeyer. Again we start 
with synchronous systems. Our yardsticks are going to be of length f(k, n), where 
f(O,n)=n, andf(k+l,n)=f(k,n)2 /(k,n) Note that f(k, n) > ex(k, n) for all k 2 0 . 
and n 2 1. (Also note that there is some constant c such that f(k, n) < ex(k, cn) for 
all k>O and n > 1.) For each k2 1 and n > 1 we construct a formula qPk,n that 
forces a proposition pk to act as a yardstick of length f(k, n), in the sense that it is 
true exactly f(k, n) steps apart. The situation is shown in Fig. 7. More precisely, 
LEMMA 4.1. For all k and n, there is formula (Pk,” of KL(,, with ((P~,~I = O(k + n) 
and ad(cp,,) = k- 1, such that for all interpreted systems ME%?~,,~,~~,,~, (resp. 
ql(nl,syn+ (ig”f,.l,sync) ), we have 
if (M r, no) k vk,n? then there is some N with 0 < N < f(k, n) such that 
fOrn2n,, (M,r,n’)~pp,iffn’=n,+N+~(k,n)fOrSOmej~O. (-I) 
Moreover, (Pk.” is satisfiable with respect to ~c(n~,syncj (rev. ~~(nl,sync~~ c(nT,nl,sync,), 
cp k,n 
+ pk 
- - 
k 
. 
FIG. 7. Encoding yardsticks with qt., and pk. 
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ProoJ: We construct (P~,~ by induction on k. In the course of our construction 
we will also need formulas cp;,, which are just like (Pk,n except that all occurrences 
of K, are replaced by K, and vice versa. By symmetry, it will be easy to check that 
cp;,, satisfies (t). 
We now describe the construction of (P~,~. The idea is to partition every run into 
segments of length n, and to view each such segment as an n-bit binary counter. We 
then force consecutive counters to differ by 1 modulo 2”. Thus, the counter will take 
on consecutively all the values from 0 to 2” - 1. The formula pi will be true exactly 
when the counter is at 0, and thus will be true every f( 1, n) = n2” steps. We proceed 
as follows. 
We first define some abbreviations. Let 0 ‘$ and 0 “+ both the abbreviations 
for the formula O$, let O”$ denote 0 Ok-‘$ for k > 1, and let 0 ‘k$ denote 
O(J/AO Gk-‘$). It is easy to see that OSk+ is equivalent to O’$ A . . . A Ok+; 
however, note that as we have defined it, the formula 0 <“p has length 0(n) (since 
p is a primitive proposition), whereas the length of Op A .-- A 0”p is O(n2). 
We use p. to mark the beginning of a counter. Let a1 be the formula 
q ((Po-=’ 0”Po) A (PO=’ o’“-I-P,)) A OP,. 
Intuitively, a1 says that the distance between the points where p. holds is precisely 
n, that p. is followed by n - 1 occurrences of -pot and that p. holds at some point 
of the run. 
We use the proposition b, to encode the bits of the counter, where b. encodes a 
1, and N b, encodes a 0. Thus, p. A b, followed by n - 1 occurrences of who 
encodes the number 2”-‘. We now want to, force consecutive counters to differ by 1 
modulo 2”. Recall that if c = c, _ 1 . . . co and d = d, _ 1 . . . do are two n-bits binary 
numbers, then d is the successor of c modulo 2” precisely when the following holds: 
ci = di iff c, = 0 for some 0 d j -C i; i.e., the ith bits in c and d are the same iff some 
bit cj in c with j< i is 0. 
Let a2 be the formula 
q (o(bo upo)*(bo* on-b,) A (-b,=> onbo)) 
A a(-O(b,~p,)~(b,~O”b,)A (-b,*O”-b,)). 
Intuitively, the first conjunct of a2 says that if, for some i, all the bits cj, j < i, in a 
counter are 1, then the jth bit of the next counter is different. The second conjunct 
says that if some bit cj, j < i, is 0, then ith bit of the next counter is the same. 
Finally, we want to force pI to be true exactly if the counter is at 0. Let a3 be the 
formula 
q (P, 0 (PO A -bo A 0(-b, UP,))). 
It is easy to see if we now define (P~,~ to be the conjunction of aI, a2, and a3, then 
it has the required property (t). 
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The construction of qk+ ,,n proceeds along very similar lines. We partition runs 
into segments of length f(k, n), using pk to mark the beginning of each segment. 
Again, we view each of these segments as an f(k, n)-bit binary counter, using the 
proposition 6, + I to encode the bits, and force consecutive counters to differ by 1 
modulo 2f(k*n). The formula pk + , will be true exactly when the counter is at 0, and 
thus will be true every f(k + 1, n) =f(k, n) 2f(k,n) steps. The only thing that 
prevents the definition of rpPk + I,n from being identical to that of (P,,~ is that we now 
cannot mark off segments of length f(k, n) using Of(k,n) in the same way we did in, 
for example, tlz, since the resulting formula would then be much too big. Our 
construction uses nested K,‘s and the fact that we are in an interpreted system with 
no forgetting and/or no learning to measure this distance in a more succinct way. 
The idea is to distribute yardsticks across runs accessible by the IV, relation in such 
a way that at every step, there is some accessible run whose counter is at 0. This is 
the job of the formula /Ii, defined as 
~(K,(qk-d,?J * -K,-(P/c A q/c) A Kl(Oqk*qk))- 
Recall that cp;,, is the result of reversing the roles of K, and K2 in (P~,~. We can 
think of the proposition qk in the formula /Ii as denoting a run that encodes a 
counter. Thus, the first conjunct of p, says that those runs by accessible by the N i 
relation where qk is true encode counters; the second conjunct says that there is 
always some run accessible by the N i relation where the counter is 0; and the third 
conjunct says that if qk is true at any point in the future, then it is true at the 
present. By the induction hypothesis, the alternation depth of pi is k. As we shall 
see, all the other conjuncts that make up (Pk + I,n will have alternation depth 0 or 1. 
Let /I2 be the formula 
n((bk+l =‘K,b,+,) * t-b+, =‘K, -bk+,)). 
Thus, #& forces bk+ i and w bk + I to be uniform across all accessible runs at any 
given level. 
We are now in a position to give an analog to al. Let /I3 be the formula 
q (o(bk+l UPk)*(bk+l =-K,(P, * qk* 0(-p, u(pk A ‘-bk+l)))) 
* (-‘b/c+, =‘Kl(Pk A qk=‘O(-pk u(Pk “bk+l))))) 
q tNO(bk+l UpJ*@k+l *KI(P~ * q/c* O(-P~ U(P, h bk+l)))) 
* (-kc+1 *KI(P, A q/c* o(-Pk U(P, * -b/c+,))))). 
Intuitively, the formula Kl(pk A qk * 0( -pk U (pk A - bk+ I))) in the first con- 
junct of 8s plays the same role as On-b0 in the first conjunct of a*. To see this, 
suwose ME (ik;nes,nc~ (rev. ‘%,sync)9 %f,nl,syncJ. Moreover, suppose (M r, 4 I= 
pi A & A /& and, for some n’ 2 n,, we have (M, r, n’) + bk + , A 0 (bk + 1 Up,). We 
want to show that (M, r, n’+f(k, n)) k - bk+ ,. The argument now splits into two 
cases, depending on whether processors do not learn or do not forget. 
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If processors do not learn (i.e., M is in Q?C”,,sync) or %C(nr,n,,sync)), then by /3r, we 
know that there exists a run r’ such that (r, n’) N, (r’, n’) and (M, r’, n’) k 
Pk A qk h (Pi,“. Since processors do not learn, it must also be the case that 
(r, n’ +ftk n)) - 1 (r’, n’ +f(k, n)). By induction hypothesis, we know that 
(M, r’, n’ +f(k, n)) k pk and that (M, r’, n’ + i) l= -pk for 0 < i<f(k, n). By /13, 
we have (M, r’, n’ + f(k, n)) l= N bk + 1, Finally, by /Iz, we also have 
(M, r, n’ + f(k, n)) k w bk + , , as desired. 
If processors do not forget (i.e., ME %C,,l,sync) ), then we essentially run through 
the same arguments as above, backwards. This time, by /Ii, we know that 
there is another run r’ such that (r, n’ +f(k, n)) N i (r’, n’ +f(k, n)) and 
(M, r’, n’ + f(k, n)) b pk A qk. Since processors do not forget, it must also be the 
case that (r, n’) N i (r’, n’). By fil again, we have that (M, r’, n’) k qk (by the 
09, * qk clause) and hence that (M, r’, n’) l= cpb,,. By the induction hypothesis, 
we know that (M, r’, n’) i= pk and (M, r’, n’ + i) b -pk for 0 c i < f(k, n). By p3, 
(M, r’, n’+f(k, n)) != Nbk+l. Finally, by /12, we also have (M, r, n’ + f (k, n)) k 
-b k+l> as desired. Similar proofs work for all the other conjuncts. 
Finally, let /I4 be 
q (Pk+1 -(P/c A -&+I A O(-bk+l uPk)))- 
Thus, /I4 forces pk+ , to be true exactly when the counter is 0. 
Let (~~+r,~ be /?i A /I2 A b3 A b4. It is now easy to check that qk+r,” satisfies (t), 
that ad((Pk+ l,n) = k, and that Iqplr+ ,,“I = O(k + 1 + n). 
Next we must show that (Pk,rt is satisfiable. We proceed by induction on k, but we 
use a stronger induction hypothesis: For each i 2 0 there is an interpreted system A4 
in ~~(nf,nl,sync~ such that for some run r of M we have that (M, r, 0) k (Pk,” and 
tMT r~ i) k Pk. Since g@f,nl,sync) = %$sync) n gcnl,sync)p the result also holds for the 
other classes. The proof is by induction on k. 
Fix i >, 0. For k = 1, A4 consists of a single run r. We let (M, r, j) k p. iff 
j= i (mod n). Thus, the points where p. is true partition r into segments of length n 
starting at rem(i, n), where rem(i, n) is the remainder of the division of i by n. Now 
we set the truth value of b,, in such a way that the segments encode an n-bit counter 
and the segment between i and i + n - 1 encodes 0. Finally, we let (A4, r, j) k p1 iff 
j=i (mod f(l, n)). Thus, (M, r, 0) l= ql,” and (M, r, i) /= p,. 
Suppose we have proved the claim for P~,~. By symmetry the claim also holds for 
cp;,,. For 0 < 1 <f (k, n), let M, be an interpreted system with run set R,, such that 
for some r/E R, we have that (M,, r,, 0) l== cpk,, and (M,, r,, I) k pk. Note that qk 
does not occur in cp;,,, so we can assume that its truth values in M, is undefined. 
We let (M,, r,, j) k qk for all j > 0 and (M,, r, j) k N qk for r # r, and j 2 0. We 
construct M = (R, K) by taking R to be the union of the R,‘s (which we take to be 
disjoint). We assume that the processor’s local states in each of the R,‘s are distinct 
except that processor l’s local state is the same in r,,(j) and r,2(j) for j> 0 and 
0 < Ii, I2 < f(k, n). Thus, the equivalence relation N 2 in M is just the union of the 
equivalence relations in M,, while the equivalence relation w, in M is the union of 
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the equivalence relations - I in M, augmented by the pairs ( (rl,, j), (r,,, j) ) for 
ja 0 and 0 < 1,) I2 < f(k, n). Since in cp;,, every knowledge subformula is governed 
by a K,, it follows that (M, T,, 0) t= cph, for all runs t-t in M. Moreover, since every 
conjunct of cp;,, is prefixed with Cl, it actually follows that (M, r,, n’) k cp;,,, for 
all n’> 0. Finally, since qk holds only on the r,‘s, it is easy to check that our 
construction guarantees that (M, rl, 0) k /I, for all the r,‘s. 
We now define truth values for bk+ i and pk+ , . Choose some 1 with I= i 
(modf(k, n)). For this choice of f we have (M, r,, j) k pk iff j= i (mod f(k, n)). By 
the induction hypothesis, the points where pk is true partition r, into segments of 
length f(k, n) starting at rem(i, f(k, n)). We set the truth value of b,, , in the run r, 
in such a way that these segments encode an f(k, n)-bit counter and the segment 
between i and i +f(k, n) encodes 0. For other runs r in M we let (M, r, j) b bk+ 1 
iff (M,r,,j) k bkfl. Thus, we have (M, r,, 0) k /I2 A f13. Finally, we let 
(M r,A t= pk+, iff j=i (modf(k+l,n)). Thus, (M,r,,O) + (P~+,,~ and 
(M, rr, i) /= pk + i . This completes the proof. 1 
THEOREM 4.2. Any algorithm that decides whether the KL,,, (resp. KB,,,), 
m > 2, formula cp is valid must have the following complexity for infinitely many 
formulas cp with respect to the following classes of interpreted systems. 
1. %(n~,n~,syncj and +4n~,syncj: space ex(ad(cp), c 1~1) for some constant c>O. 
2. %n~,sync) and +fcnf,sync,uis): time ex(ad(cp)+ 1, c 1~1) for some constant c>O, 
Proof: As in the proof of Theorem 3.2, the idea is to encode the computations of 
a Turing machine. For part 1, given a Turing machine A that uses space at most 
ex(k, 1x1) on input x, we show how to uniformly construct a family of formulas Y*,,~ 
in KLC2, such that (1) ad(y, ,) = k, (2) for some constant c>O, we have 
IyA,,l = c 1x1, and (3) (Pi is satisfiable with respect to %$,r,.,,,,,,, (resp. %?c(nl,sync)) iff A 
accepts x. We then show how to modify the construction to deal with part 2. 
Again we assume that A has state space S and tape alphabet r, and we let CD be 
the set of cell descriptors as before. We assume without loss of generality that there 
is a unique accepting state qa, so that A accepts x iff it reaches state q0 at some 
point in its computation. Fix an input x with 1x1 = n, so that x =x, . .. x,. We know 
that on input x no more than space ex(k, n) is used in the computation, so we take 
all ID’s to have length f(k, n)>ex(k, n) (padding with blanks if necessary), 
separated by #. The crucial difference between this proof and that of Theorem 3.2 
is that now we encode the computation of A oertically along the run, using the 
yardstick (P,+n. 
The first conjunct of yA,x is the analog of cpl in Theorem 3.2. Let yi be 
q (,Y, KI (PC A - (,,~d,,4~ 
If (M, r, n’) k yi, then at most one cell descriptor holds at every point in runs 
reachable by - r from (r, n’) and cell descriptors are uniform across - , . 
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Since we are using p# to delimit ID’s, we want p# to be true at the beginning of 
the run and at all later points exactly f(k, n) apart. It is here that we need to use 
our yardsticks. Let y2 be 
Px 
Note that the second line in this formula is exactly the formula /I,, and has the job 
of distributing yardsticks. The third line essentially uses these yardsticks in much 
the same way as they are used in the formula fiJ to guarantee that the distance 
between the points, where p# is true is f(k, n). Thus, if ME %C(n,,syncJ and 
CM r, n’) I= Yl A Y2, then for all r’ such that (r, n’) - i (r’, n’) we have that 
(M,r’,j)kp+ iffj=if(k,n)for some i>O. 
We now describe the formulas that force run segments to encode successive ID’s 
of A. Since we are encoding the computation of A on input x, the first ID is of the 
form #(x1, so) x~...x,V(~*~)-~ (recall that b is the blank symbol and s0 is the 
start state). Let y3 be 
P# A o(P<x,,,, * o(Px, A o(... A o(Px, A o(P, UP,))***))). 
y3 forces the first segment to encode the starting ID. 
To enforce correct transitions we again use the fact that it suffices to examine 
triples of cells descriptors, and encode this information in the function N. (Recall 
that N is the function from the proof of Theorem 3.2 that, given three consecutive 
cells in an ID, describes the set of possible corresponding three cells in the next ID.) 
Since all ID’s are of length f(k, n), in order to compare corresponding triples of cell 
descriptors, we have to compare cells that are f(k, n) cells apart. Let y4 be 
0 
(, 
ij,?,, (pi A OPj * 00~1) 
* v Kl(pk A qk a o( -Pk u (Pk A PC A OP, A 0 o!‘,))) - 
<c.d,e> E N(i, j.0 ) 
y4 guarantees that the transitions behave according to N and that they are correct. 
This follows from the fact that the cell descriptors are uniform over accessible runs 
and from the properties of pk. 
Finally, we must say that we have an accepting computation. Recall that A 
accepts x iff it eventually goes into state s,. Let ys be 
Let YA,x be Al<,<5 Yi. Note that ad(y) = k. It is also easy to check that yA,+ is 
satisfied by an interpreted system in %C”(nf,nl.sync) (resp. %‘C(nl.sync)) iff A accepts x. If A 
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accepts x, consider an interpreted system satisfying (Pi+ ,,nr as constructed in the 
proof of Lemma 4.1. As the construction shows, we can actually assume that 
tMy r3 O) k (Pk+ 1,n for some run r of M. We can now easily lay out the computation 
of M along run r in such a way as to satisfy Y*,~. More precisely, we define the 
truth values of the primitive propositions pc, c E CD, so that we can divide each run 
r’ with (r’, 0) - 1 (r, 0) into a sequence of segments of length f(k, n) encoding the 
ID’s of an accepting run of A on input x. Since yi requires that the truth values of 
p,, c E CD, are uniform across all - , accessible runs and there is no learning, we 
must lay out the same computation along all runs. (Note that the fact that 
WC r, 0) k cp k+ i,” guarantees that fi2, which is part of y2, is also satisfied.) 
Conversely, it is easy to see that if ME%?~,,~,~,,~~~~) (resp. %&sync)) and 
tMy ry n, k (PA+? then, by y2, we can partition run r into segments of length f(k, n) 
starting at (r, n) so that each segment encodes an ID. By yj and y4, this sequence 
of ID’s is actually a computation of A on input x, and by ys, it is an accepting 
computation. The lower bound for %?c,r,n,,syncj and GF?~,,,,~,,~~) in the case of KL,,,, 
m > 2, immediately follows. 
To get the result for KB(,), again we replace occurrences of 0 by VO and 0 by 
VO, and the occurrence of 0 in ys by VO. We leave it to the reader to check that 
this has the desired effect. (We remark that since we are working in systems with no 
learning, replacing the 0 in ys by 30 also works, as the interested reader can 
verify.) 
To get the lower bound in the case of %?cor,syncJ and V?~(nr,sync,u,sj for the language 
KL,,,, m>2, we encode alternating Turing machines (ATMs) [CKS]. The 
difference between this case and the previous case is that the possibility of learning 
allows us to simultaneously encode different runs of the ATM, in a sense we make 
precise. We first review the necessary definitions. 
In an ATM, there is a subset U E S of universal states. The states in S- U are 
existential states. There is an accepting state s,. At each configuration the machines 
has two possible moves. Thus, every ID has two successors. It is convenient to 
assume that the machine starts in a universal state and alternates at every step, that 
is, if the ID j? is a successor of the ID tl, then the state of a is existential iff the state 
of fi is universal. An ATM A accepts input x if there is an infinite tree, called an 
acceptirzg computation tree of A on x, labeled by ID’s such that 
1. the root of the tree is labeled by the initial ID of A on x, 
2. if a node u is labeled with an existential ID a, then u has one child that is 
labeled by a successor of a, 
3. if a node u is labeled by a universal ID a, then u has two children labeled 
by the two successors of a, and 
4. every infinite path through the tree is eventually labeled with an accepting 
ID. 
It is known that a language L is accepted by a deterministic Turing machine 
within time 0(2S(n)), where S(n) > log(n), iff L is accepted by an alternating Turing 
machine in space O(S(n)) [CKS]. Thus, ASPACE(ex(k, n)) = TIME(ex(k + 1, n)). 
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As before, given an ATM A which runs in (alternating) space ex(k, n) and an 
input x, we construct a formula 6,,, which is satisfiable with respect to 9?cnl,sync) iff A 
accepts x. 
The idea now is to encode different possible computations (i.e., paths in the com- 
putation tree) along different runs. Thus, we have to force the properties we 
required last time to hold on all - I accessible runs, not just one. We accomplish 
this by prefixing relevant formulas by K, . Thus, we take fil, L&, 6,, and 6, to be as 
K,Y,, 02, 03, and Kh respectively. Besides adding the K1, we have to 
slightly modify y4 to take into account the alternation. Since an ID has two possible 
successors, we now have two transition functions rather than one; call them N, and 
N,. Let ds be 
i,j,leCD ( 
(Pi * OPj * O OPl) 
+ V KI(P, A qk * o( -,Pk u (Pk A Pc * OP, A 0 OP,))) 
) 
* 
19q~2,<c,d,e)fNl(i,j,l) 
6, guarantees that all transitions behave according to either N1 or N,. 
We now need a formula that guarantees that when we are in a universal state, 
both transitions occur. In order to do this, we introduce a new primitive 
proposition p, to indicate whether or not we are in a universal state. Let a6 be the 
formula 
pu * K, q (P”*KI P,) 
* K, q (O -P# * (~“0 OP,)) 
AK,~(OP,*(P~~O-PJ). 
The first conjunct of d6 says the initial state is universal, the second conjunct says 
that p, is uniform over -i accessible runs, the third conjunct says that the truth 
value of pu is constant throughout an ID, while the fourth conjunct says that it 
changes between consecutive IDS. 
In order to capture the alternation in A, we encode different paths in the com- 
putation tree of A along different runs in the system. We could not do this when we 
had no learning, since we insist (in formula y1 and 6,) that the values of p, for 
c E CD are uniform across - 1 accessible runs. But once we have learning, we can 
have the equivalence relations reline, allowing us to encode different paths. Let 8, 
be 
KIT /j (Pu A Pi * OPj A O”Pl) 
i, j, / E CD 
=.a A -K, -(P/c * qk 
1~~62. <c,d.r>tN,(i.i,I) 
~o(-pku(PkAP,.A OP,A OOP,))) 
> 
. 
571/38/l-15 
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Thus, 6, says that when we are in a universal state, there are accessible runs that 
encode both possible transitions. Note that the formula 6, A 6, is not satisfiable 
with respect to %?~(nr,n,,syncJ. 
Let b,, be the conjunction of 6, through 6,. A similar argument to that above 
can now be used to show that 6, x is satisfiable with respect to %?c(nr,syncJ iff A accepts 
input x. We encode different ‘paths in the computation tree, which are N, 
equivalent as long as the computations agree. A slight modification, along the lines 
sketched in Lemma 3.4, suffices to deal with %~(nF,sync,ulsJ. We simply add a new first 
state to every run in which the global states is the same. We leave details to the 
reader. Finally, to deal with KB,,,,,, we again replace 17, 0, and 0 by t/Cl, VO, 
and VU. 1 
Observe that the formula (P,,~ (and thus cp;,,) does not have any occurrences of 
K1 or K2. Thus, the formula needed to encode TMs (resp. ATMs) that run in space 
ex( 1, (xl ) involves only K, , and not K2. This gives us the following immediate 
corollary to the preceding theorem. 
COROLLARY 4.3. Any algorithm that decides whether the KL(,, (resp. KB,,,) 
formula cp is valid must have the following complexity for infinitely many formulas cp 
with respect to the following classes of interpreted systems: 
1. ~~e,,f,.~,,y,,~, ~w,,,,,), v(&(nl,sync,uis), ~~nf,n~,sync,uis): pace ex(1, c lql) for some 
constant c > 0 (i.e., exponential space) 
2. ~w,sync) and ~~(nf,sync,uis): time ex(2, c Iv/) for some constant c > 0 (i.e., 
double-exponential time). 
Proof The only cases that are not immediate from the previous proof are 
~(“l,sync,~uis) and %,t~l,SYnC. uis) (which are actually the same case, as observed in 
Proposrtion 3.9). This case follows from the observation that the standard trick for 
dealing with a unique initial state-that of adding a new initial state to each 
run-now works. (It does not work if we have many agents since then adding the 
initial state imposes extra constraints on the system.) We leave details to the 
reader. 1 
Remarks. 1. Sistla and German [SG] have independently proved 
EXPSPACE-completeness for their logic IPTL, which is‘ essentially the same as 
KL(,, interpreted over interpreted systems in %c&(n,,nf,sync). 
2. We can avoid the use of the until operator in this proof, using only the 0 
and q operators, by appropriately encoding a formula of the form cp U $. The idea 
is to introduce a new primitive proposition q to encode where cp U $ is true, and 
adding the conjuncts q (q* O$) and q (qo $ v (cp A Oq)). We leave it to the 
reader to check that this works. 
Again, in the presence of no forgetting, it is easy to drop the assumption that 
time is synchronous. 
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PROPOSITION 4.4. For any formula cp in KL,,, (resp. KB,,,), m > 2, there is a 
formula sync, such that ad(sync,) = ad(q), Isync, < c 1~1 for some constant c > 0, 
and cp is satisfiable with respect o (&(n~sync) (rev. +b,n~,sync), g((ntsync,uis)) iff 
cp A sync, is satisfiable with respect to ‘ZCcna (resp. %?~(nf,nlj, ~~“z.i,)). 
Proof The details are essentially the same as those of Proposition 3.5, except 
that now we cannot use C, and we must be careful in terms of the length and the 
alternation depth of sync,. The idea is to replace C by the appropriate number of 
alternation of Kis. Given cp, let tick be a primitive proposition not appearing in cp. 
We define sync, for subformulas of Ic/ by induction on the structure of $ as 
l For a primitive proposition p, let sync, = true 
. sync* h ti, = sync* oti, = sync, A sync,, 
. sync_+ = syncoti = sync, 
l synck,,=K,Ci((tick=>K,tick) A (-tick==-K,tick) A (tick*O-tick) h 
(-tick => Otick) A syn+). 
The proof that this works is similar to that of Proposition 3.5. Of course, sync, 
does not force the whole system to be synchronous, but only those runs relevant to 
our argument. But this clearly sullices for our purposes. We leave details to the 
reader. [ 
As an immediate corollary we get 
COROLLARY 4.5. Any algorithm for checking if the KL,,, (resp. KB,,,) formula cp 
is valid must have the following complexity for infinitely many formulas cp with 
respect to the following classes of interpreted systems: 
1. %,w): space Wd(cp), c Id) f or some constant c>O (and ex(1, c IqI) if 
m=l) 
2. (&(nf)I q((nr,uis): time ex(ad(cp) + 1, c 1~1) for some constant c>O (and 
ex(2, c 1~1) zfm = 1). 
We can again avoid the use of the nexttime operator in this proof. See the 
Appendix for details. 
We next consider the complexity of the validity problem for g(“r, and ~~:(nl,uis). We 
can combine the ideas of Theorem 3.8 and Theorem 4.2 to get: 
THEOREM 4.6. Any algorithm that decides whether the KL,,, (resp. KB,,,) 
formula cp is valid with respect to V (,,I) (rev. w(nl,uis)) must take space exWW9 c Id 1 
for some c > 0 and infinitely many formulas cp. 
Proof We modify the construction of the yardsticks (P~,~ by adding the clause 
nonrep * K,(nonrep) to the construction of (Pi,“. (Of course, this means the clause 
nonrep => K,(nonrep) is now added to the definition of q;,,, and these clauses will 
be nested in the definition of (P~,~ for k > 1). We also add the conjunct Sync,, from 
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Proposition 4.4. This forces weak synchrony in the nonrepeating part of the runs, 
so that in the nonrepeating part, (the modified) qk,+ forces pk to act like a 
yardstick. 
Finally, we modify the definition of the formula ys in the construction of qa of 
Theorem 4.2 to 
(nonrep) IJ ( cG;{SU, pc). 
This forces the run to be nonrepeating until we reach an accepting state. Thus, in 
the part of the run that is relevant to the lower bound proof, the yardstick 
construction works right. This gives us the desired lower bound. 1 
As a corollary to the proof, we again get: 
COROLLARY 4.7. Any algorithm that decides whether the KL(,, (resp. KB,,,) 
formula cp is valid with respect to %&,, (resp. ~~,,,uis)) takes space ex( 1, c 1~1) for some 
constant c > 0 and infinitely many formulas cp (i.e., exponential space). 
We remark that in the last section we already discussed the complexity of KL,,, 
and K&j in @(&(nl,uis) and q(?(nf,nl,uis) (recall that the results here depended on the 
proofs of Ladner and Reif), so all that remains is to discuss the cases where we do 
not assume no learning and no forgetting. Just as in the case of CKL,,, and 
CKBw the complexity goes down dramatically in these cases. Note that the next 
theorem is the only one in which there is a difference between branching time and 
linear time. 
THEOREM 4.8. 1. The validity problem for KL,,,, m > 1, with respect to V, 
v w(s(sync,uis)9 (sync)) and WcUiSJ is PSPACE-hard. 
2. The validity problem for KB,,,, m > 1, with respect to %?, Ce(s,,ncJ, %‘~(sync,uisJ, 
and ~~“is) is EXPTIME-hard. 
Proof: The result follows immediately from the fact that even without 
knowledge operators, linear time logic is PSPACE-hard [HR, SC] while branching 
time logic is EXPTIME-hard [EHl]. It is interesting that the difference here again 
comes between being able to encode deterministic TMs that run in polynomial 
space and alternating TMs that run in polynomial space. 1 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
We have carefully examined the complexity of reasoning about knowledge and 
time, indicating how different constraints on the system and different choices of 
modalities may affect the complexity. We have completely characterized the com- 
plexity of the validity problem for a number of combinations of parameters of 
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interest. We have presented the general framework and lower bound proofs here; 
the upper bound proofs will appear in a sequel to this paper. 
The most significant conclusion we can draw from these results is that by making 
the assumption that processors do not forget, we greatly complicate the process of 
reasoning about knowledge and time. While no forgetting is obviously an 
unrealistic assumption, it is an assumption that is often implicitly made in proofs 
and specifications. For example, we do not usually say explicitly that the processor 
still remembers the initial value of the variable x. However, this assumption is often 
unnecessary. In fact, in almost all cases where no forgetting is implicitly assumed, 
the assumption can in fact be dropped (only the values of a few variables, which 
take on only finitely many possible values, really need to be remembered). Our 
results suggest that, if possible, it may be worthwhile not to make the assumption 
of no forgetting. (This approach may have the added advantage of making clear 
exactly how much storage is needed for the algorithm.) 
As already mentioned in [HMl 1, one use that can be made of such a formal 
model of knowledge and time is in specifying protocols. Once we can specify 
protocols, we can perhaps use techniques similar to those of [EC, MW] to syn- 
thesize a protocol from its specifications. If we use a logic like CKL~,) as a 
specification language, the observations above suggest that we should not assume 
no forgetting unless it is absolutely necessary; instead, we should explicitly encode 
into the specification formula the facts that are not forgotten. 
Another line of research inspired in part by the considerations of this paper is 
that of describing what states of knowledge are attainable in distributed systems. 
We have given a somewhat abstract notion of model here and have not concerned 
ourselves, for example, with the mechanics of the transition between global states. If 
we consider concrete distributed systems, we may want to put restrictions on the 
possible transitions that can occur or on the possible initial states that arise. As is 
shown in [FHV2], such restrictions can have a critical impact on the properties of 
knowledge. Even if we project away time, and only consider formulas involving 
K;s, the S5 axioms for knowledge discussed in the previous section, while still 
sound, may not be complete. Again assumptions such as no forgetting can make a 
big difference. We refer the interested reader to [FHV2] for more details. 
While we have done a relatively exhaustive analysis of the possibilities here, there 
is perhaps one further complexity issue that might be investigated: that of taking 
the only temporal modalities to be 0 and its dual 0 in the linear time case (and 
V 0, 3 Cl, and their duals in the branching time case). In this case we do not have 
either the nexttime operator or the until operator in the language. Sistla and Clarke 
have shown that the validity problem for linear time temporal logic with just 0 
and 0 is NP-complete [SC]. (See [SZ] for a further discusion of the advantages 
of using just the 0 and 0 operators.) We conjecture that even with knowledge 
operators in the language, the complexity still becomes much simpler without 0 
and U. However, since this gives us yet another ninety-six logics to consider, we 
leave the question for others to look into. 
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APPENDIX: REMOVING THE NEXTTIME OPERATOR 
In this appendix we show how to avoid the use of the nexttime operator in our 
lower bound results. We first focus on the case with common knowledge and then 
show how to modify the proof to deal with KL,,, and KB,,,. Formally, we prove 
the following result. 
THEOREM A.l. For all formulas cp in CKL,,, (resp. CKB,,,), there is a formula 
‘pv not involving the nexttime operator such that cp is satisfiable with respect to 
%T (nf,sync) Crew ~~nf,.~,sync~~ q((nl,sync,uis)) if and on& if ‘Pu is satisfiable with respect to 
@(“fj (rev %~,dj, w(nf,uis))- 
Prooj Assume cp is in CKL,,, (the modifications for CKB(,,) are 
straightforward and left to the reader). Intuitively, the idea is to use a new primitive 
proposition q (not appearing in cp) to mark off sections of a run where the truth 
values of all formulas are constant. These q-sections correspond to “points.” 
Corresponding to a subformula of cp of the form O$, we have the translated 
formula that says that + is true at the next q-section. 
More formally, we proceed as follows. Given a formula $, let tiy be the formula 
that results by recursively replacing all subformulas in $ of the form O$’ by 
(y.~qu(-q~II/;))~(-q~-qu(q~~;)). 
This formula captures the idea that $‘,, is true in the next q-section. Let $ < cp 
denote that 1+5 is a subformula of cp. Let ‘pU be 
‘pv* CO(q*Cq) 
A CO(Oq A O-q). 
Note that the second conjunct says that the truth value of q is common knowledge 
throughout the system (it is easy to see that CO(q =- Cq) implies CO( -q =S 
C N q)), the third conjunct says that the truth value of $ y for all subformulas IJQ of cp 
is constant until the truth value of q changes, and the fourth conjunct says that the 
truth value of q at any point does eventually change. 
We now show that cp is satisfiable with respect to %c(nl,syncJ (resp. 9&,l,n,,sync,, 
Q? (nf,sync,uis)) iff ‘PU is satisfiable with respect to w(,o (rev %cnf,nl), w(nf,uis)). 
Suppose that cp is satisfiable in some interpreted system M in (ik;,r,,,,,, (resp. 
%T (“f, “I, sync) 3 %? (nT,sync,uis)). Let M, be identical to M except that the truth value of q 
changes at consecutive points along every run in M. Clearly ME 59u,l) (resp. %cnf,n,), 
Vc,,r,uis)). The last three conjuncts of (pU are then trivially satisfied at every point in 
M,. A straightforward induction on the structure of formulas shows that for all 
subformulas $ of rp, we have (M, r, n) k$ iff (M,, r, n) k $ “. Thus, ‘pU is 
satisfiable in M,. 
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For the converse, suppose that ‘pr/ is satisfiable in some interpreted system 
M= (4 4 in Q%lj (rev. ~~nf,,l~~ vt(nf,uis))* Suppose that (M, ro, no) I= ‘PU. Let R’ 
consist of all the runs in R with points reachable from (ro, no). For every run r’ E R’, 
let (r’, n:) be the first point in r’ reachable from (ro, no). We can now define the kth 
q-section of r’ in a straightforward way. For example, if (M, r’, n,.) + q, then the 
first q-section consists of all the points (r’, n,.), . . . . (r’, n,.. +n) such that 
(M, r’, n,, + i) /= q for 0 < i < n, and (M, r’, n,. + n + 1) + wq. The second q-section 
consists of all the points (r’, n,. + n + l), . . . . (r’, n,. + n + k) such that 
(M,r’,n.+n+j)kwq for l<j<k and (M,r’,n,.+n+k+l)+q. We omit a 
formal inductive definition here. The third conjunct of ‘pv guarantees that for all 
subformulas $ of cp, the truth values of tiy will be constant in every q-section of r’. 
The fourth conjunct guarantees that every run in R’ has infinitely many q-sections. 
Using the second conjunct we can now show that the q-sections respect the -i 
equivalence relations in the following sense: 
LEMMA A.2. Suppose rl, r2ER’, (rl, n,) wi (r2, n,), and (rI, n,) is in the kth 
q-section of r,, then (r2, n2) is in the kth q-section of r2. Moreover, if(rl, n,) is the 
firstpoint in the kth q-section of rl, then (r,, n,) wi (r2, n3), where (r2, n3) is thefirst 
point in the kth q-section of r2. 
Proox We proceed by induction on k. Without loss of generality we can assume 
that (M, rl, n,) b q. The case k = 0 breaks down into two subcases. First suppose 
that (rl, nI) is the first point in the 0th q-section of rl. Let (r2, n3) be the first point 
in the 0th q-section of r2. Clearly n3 <n,, so, by our assumption of no forgetting, it 
follows that for some point n4 < nl, we must have (rl, n4) wi (r2, n3). But, by 
assumption, (rl , n 1) is the first point reachable in rl reachable from (ro, no), so we 
must have n, =n4. Thus, (rl, n,) mi (r2, n3). By transitivity, we also have 
(r2, n2) N i (r2, n3), so, from the assumption that processors do not forget, we get 
(r2, n’) -i (r2, n3) for all n’ with n3 $ n’ d n2. Since the truth value of q is common 
knowledge, q must be true at (r2, n,), (r2, n,), and at all points in between. Thus, 
(r2, n3) and (r2, n2) must be in the same q-section. In particular, it follows that 
(r2, n2) is in the 0th q-section. 
Note that from the observations in the previous paragraph it follows that no 
point in the kth q-section of r2 can be indistinguishable by i from a point before the 
first point in the 0th q-section of rl. (To see this, note that if not, we can use the 
assumption of no forgetting to show that the first point in the 0th q-section of r2 is 
indistinguishable from a point previous to the first point in the first q-section of rl. 
This would mean that a point previous to the first point in the first q-section of r, is 
reachable from (ro, no), and this is a contradiction.) A similar remark holds when 
we reverse the roles of r, and r2. 
Now consider the case where (rl, n,) is not necessarily the first point in the 0th 
q-section. If (r2, n2) is not in the 0th q-section of r2, there is a point (r2, n4) between 
the first point in the 0th q-section of r2 and (r2, n2) such that (M, r2, n4) k mq. By 
the assumption of no forgetting, there must be a point (rl , ns) with n5 d n, such 
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that (rl, 4 -, (rz, n4). By the observations of the previous paragraph, (r, , ns) 
must be in the 0th q-section of ri. Thus, (M, rl, n,) k q. But this contradicts the 
assumption that q is common knowledge. Thus, it must be the case that (r2, n2) is 
in the 0th q-section of r2. 
For k > 0 the proof is similar. Again, we first suppose (r, , n, ) is the first point in 
the kth q-section of rl. It must be the case that (r2, nz) is in the Zth q-section for 
12 k (if we had I< k it would contradict the induction hypothesis). Thus, if (r2, n3) 
is the first point in the kth q-section of r2 we must have that n3 <n,. By the 
assumption of no forgetting, it follows that there is some point (r,, n4) such that 
(r,, 4)  -  i (r2, n3) and n4 6 n,. By the induction hypothesis, it must be the case 
that n4 =nl (since a point cannot simultaneously be in two different q-sections). 
The same arguments as above can now be used to show that (r?, nS) and (r2, nz) 
are in the same q-section. The case where (rl , n, ) is not the first point in the kth 
q-section is similar to the case k = 0. We leave details to the reader. 1 
We now build an interpreted system where cp is satisfied by collapsing all 
q-sections to single points. Given a run r E R’, let f(r) be the run such that f(r)(n) is 
the global state at the first point in the nth q-section of r. Define K’ on points in 
f(R’) x N so that n’(f(r), n) = z(r, k), where (r, k) is the first point in the nth 
q-section of r. Let M’ = (f(R’), 71’). From Lemma A.2, it easily follows that f( R’) is 
a synchronous system where processors do not forget. Moreover, if processors do 
not learn in R, then they do no learn in f(R) either. If R has a unique initial state, 
we can easily add one to f(R) as described in the proof of Lemma 3.4. 
We leave it to the reader to check that for all subformulas $ of cp and all runs 
re R’, we have (M’,f(r), n) k Ic/ iff (M, r, k) k $,,, where (r, k) is the first point in 
the nth q-section of r. (Here we use the third conjunct of cpv, which says that the 
truth value of tiu is constant over every q-section for all subformulas $ of cp). Thus, 
W’,f(roh 0) k cp. I 
Using this result we can get the ni lower bound for %&r), Ce(nT,nl), and (&(nf,“is) in 
the language CKL~,,,) ( resp. CKB,,,), m > 2, even without the nexttime operator in 
the language. (Indeed, we can also use the ideas of the proof to eliminate the 
nexttime operator in favor of the until operator even in synchronous systems, 
although we omit details here.) We remark that although we do not know how to 
replace occurrences of 0 by until, when we restrict attention to %&, the ideas in 
the proof of Theorem A.1 do apply to the nonrepeating part, so we can replace the 
use of the nexttime operator in Theorem 3.8. Thus, the I-# lower bound for @&,, 
also holds even if we do not have the nexttime operator in the language. 
We next turn our attention to the languages KL,,, and KB+,,). 
THEOREM A.3. For all formulas cp in KL(,,,) (resp. KB,,,), there is a formula cp,, 
not involving the nexttime operator such that ad(cp,)=ad(cp), Iv,] <c Irpl for some 
constant c > 0, and rp is satisfiable with respect to %Ck;,r,,yncJ (resp. %?C(nl,ol,sy “=,, 
% (nf,sync,uis)) if and only if cpU is satisfiable with respect to WCnfj (resp. +T&,,, %?c”tuis))- 
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Proof. The idea is to replace the use of C in cpU by enough alternation K,‘s to 
give us the result we need. We also have to be a little careful to make sure that 
Ip,l< c (cpl for some constant c > 0. In order to do this, we introduce a new 
primitive proposition q+ for each subformula I,+ of cp. We then inductively define the 
formula I+?~ for each subformula $ of cp; cpU will be qv A cp,. Roughly speaking, 1(1* 
says that the truth value of qa is constant along q-sections, and defines the truth 
value of ql/, in terms of that of q6. for subformulas II/’ of $. Let const(q$) be an 
abbreviation for the formula 
This formula essentially corresponds to the third conjunct in ‘pu. 
We now construct $, inductively as follows: 
l pr= const(q,) A q ( Oq A 0 -4) for a primitive proposition p 
l (-I1/)t=const(q-tiL) A q (q-p- -qb) * lcl, 
l (~~II/‘),=const(q,,,,)~ q (q,,,,oq~Ar\~,)*~,**: 
l (W),=const(qoJ,) * q (((qoJ, A 41-q u(-q A 4ti)) A 
((40$ * -I)- “4 U(4 A qlJ)) A lcIl 
l ($ UV),=const(q+u9f) A q(q,.,,-=-qti uqtif) A tit A *: 
l (W) f = const(qKiti) A q (qK,$ * Kiq*) A KiJIt * Ki q (Q” Ki4). 
It is easy to see that I$,1 <c 111/l for some c>O and that ad(l(/,)= ad(@). Finally, 
we take cpU = qrp A qt. We leave it to the reader to check that cp,, has all the required 
properties. The proof parallels that for cpU. 1 
We remark that using these ideas we can also modify the Ladner and Reif proof 
that we used as the basis of our undecidability results for the classes G&,, and 
q(nl. uis) and the languages KL,,,, KB,,,, m > 2, to eliminate the use of the nexttime 
operator. We omit the details here. 
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